As opponents of Thailand’s military-backed government launch another round of protests this month, memories of past Octobers lie heavily on the country.
Most obvious are the protests of October 14, 1973 that ended a military dictatorship and the protests of October 6, 1976 that led to a brutal, right-wing massacre of student protesters and a military coup. Also heavy on the hearts of many Thais is the October 13, 2016 death of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the country’s longest-reigning monarch.
A ceremony commemorating the people killed by police and a right-wing mob on October 6, 1976
The protests set for October 14 are a reminder of the 1973 demonstrations that led to the flight of military dictators who had once, like the current leaders, seemed all-powerful. Similarities abound, as we wrote in an earlier blog (Thai arrests and protests recall a violent past-Aug 9, 2020), but there are important differences, including:
Timing
The Covid-19 pandemic has created economic difficulty and uncertainty. The government has claimed credit for Thailand’s relatively successful handling of the pandemic even though the main contribution of the top leaders was to stay out of the way of the public health professionals. At least some Thais sympathetic to the protesters believe this is not the time to add political unrest to the health and economic challenges the country already faces.
Government handling
The government of Gen. Prayuth Chan-O-Cha, first brought to power by a 2014 military coup, has handled the resurgence in political protest more carefully than the 1973 generals. While some protest leaders have been arrested, they have, so far, been allowed bail. In contrast, the 1973 government rejected bail for those arrested, sparking widespread anger. Prime Minister Prayuth has issued a few warnings, but has left dealing with the protests to the police and the courts in contrast to the dictators who took a personal role in suppressing the 1973 demonstrations. A new round of arrests Tuesday, however, shows that this careful approach has come up against government’s concerns that the protests will impact the monarchy.
The monarchy
In 1973, the protesters saw King Bhumibol Adulyadej as a voice of calm and reason. They respectfully sought his guidance. This may have led to the king’s later role in urging the dictators to leave the country. In 2020, however, the monarchy has become the target of at least some of the protest leaders. They want to reform of the new financial and military powers held by current monarch, King Maha Vajiralongkorn, but not by his revered father. Demonstrations on October 14 were planned so King Maha Vajiralongkorn would see the protests as he travels to a scheduled appointment. On Tuesday, however, police arrested 19 protesters who had set up tents along the king’s planned route. Police claim they are worried that pro-monarchy counter-demonstrators will clash with the protesters and spark the kind of violence that erupted on October 6, 1976.
Army factionalism
It is often overlooked, but the success of the 1973 demonstrations owed much to factions in the army upset by the stranglehold the dictators tried to maintain on the top army positions. The government’s fate was sealed when Deputy Army Commander Krit Sivara refused orders to bring provincial troops into the capital to crush the protests.
While factionalism still exists in the Thai army, this month’s annual round of military promotions has installed more conservative commanders in key positions. According to Paul Chambers, a military analyst at Naresuan University, “the country’s crisis in 2020 is not only a showdown between students and arch-royalist aristocrats. It’s also a pivotal flashpoint where the military is becoming increasingly disunited. Most of its leadership in 2020 is composed of more reactionary officers willing to quash student demonstrations.”
Preparations and fears
Fortunately, there are also differences from the October 1976 bloodshed. The violence against the demonstrators at Thammasat University was the culmination of at least two years of efforts to rouse and manipulate violent political emotions. The victory of communist insurgencies in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam had made it easier to cultivate an atmosphere of fear and hysteria among ordinary Thais.
The military’s political arm organized nationalistic village groups and transported them to Bangkok to join police in attacking the student demonstrators. A key element of the right-wing propaganda, spread by the military’s near monopoly control of radio and television, was the threat to King Bhumibol. This threat was overblown, but not irrational. The Lao Communist insurgents who seized power in 1975 had forced the King Sisavang Vatthana to abdicate. (He was later arrested and sent to a ‘re-education camp’ where he died.)
In 2020, however, there are no realistic threats to the king. The Communist governments of the region are no longer seen as threats. The military does not appear to have carried out the kind of preparations that paved the way to their 1976 overthrow of the elected government.
Gen. Prayut talks to the news media.
With Gen. Prayut as prime minister and in control of the Senate and the bureaucracy, there is no reason for the military to do anything against him. In any case, it would not be easy for pro-military and pro-monarchy groups to rouse political emotions as they did to prepare the way for the 2014 coup. As a new king, King Maha Vajiralongkorn has not yet been able to equal his father’s devoted following built by years of service, constant presence and invariably favorable news coverage.
Sorrow and respect
Many Thais spent Tuesday in remembrance of King Bhumibol, who passed away on October 13, 2016. Religious ceremonies were held around the country and many people wore the king’s color yellow as a show of respect. On the throne for 66 years, King Bhumibol traveled extensively in the rural areas of the country, setting up projects and organizations to deal with the difficulties faced by poor Thais. He projected a calm and concerned persona. He was a dedicated family man and rarely went anywhere without his wife or at least one of his children. Throughout the last four decades of his reign he never left the country.
The protesters’ main demands are for a new, more democratic constitution, an end to the military’s political dominance, the resignation of the government and new elections. They have, however, also called for a reform of the constitutional monarchy. This is a demand rarely heard in public.
Hopes for change
The protests of 1973 and, more ominously, of 1976 led to abrupt change. October 14, 1973 brought the resignation of the government, a more democratic constitution and new elections. October 6, 1976 brought a military coup, rule by decree, an increase in the military’s political power and an upsurge in violence from the communist insurgency.
The protesters in this October also call for sudden and sweeping change.
“We will bring Thailand back under democracy and return power to the people,” activist Panupong Jadnok told reporters. He cited the sudden overthrow of the absolute monarch in 1932. The ideals of that movement, he said, remain “in the hearts of all democracy-loving citizens.”
A plaque commemorating the 1932 overthrow of the absolute monarchy made by protesters in 2020 to call for the democracy sought nearly nine decades ago, but never fully achieved.
In 2020, however, no such quick changes seem likely. The hopes of the protesters and the threats to the government and the military appear more likely in the long term.
Earlier this month, the government announced that new elections for provincial councils will be held on December 20, after a decade without such elections. The provincial elections, along with voting for municipal and sub-district posts expected next year, will be a test of the government’s popularity and the ability of the opposition to organize effectively.
Demonstrations this year have won support from the educated urban youth who flocked to the Future Forward Party that came in third in the national elections. The courts, however, dissolved the party and banned its leaders on election technicalities. Sitting side-by-side with them in the demonstrations were older, working class followers of the Pheu Thai Party, which won the greatest number of seats in the 2019 national elections. Pheu Thai was kept out of government by the powerful, appointed Senate comprised largely of military officers.
Urban youth and rural and working class poor join a demonstration calling for democratic change.
If opposition parties can survive any further legal attacks, overcome election processes favoring the military and bring these two groups of voters together, they would pose a serious problem for Prayut’s coalition. That coalition, cobbled together with politicians from various parties, is already troubled by factional in-fighting. If the current government cannot stick together, revive the economy and overcome concerns about the power of the military, it may find political opponents gaining many local seats. Those seats could be useful in national elections that must be held by 2023 or sooner if Prayut’s coalition breaks up.
Even the most sweeping opposition election victories, however, would not mean an immediate end to the military’s entrenched political power, but they could be the first steps on a long, difficult road of reform returning power to the Thai people.