The latest twist in the history of gambling in Thailand

The Thai government is once again struggling to establish a consistent and enforceable policy on gambling, hoping to win big on tourists, revenue, and jobs. This is the latest twist in more than a century of shifting approaches to games of chance.

The changes could come in a law under consideration to establish “Entertainment Complexes.” Casino gambling will be the main profit engine driving these complexes. Allowing gambling has aroused both support and condemnation, continuing the controversy that has surrounded gambling in Thailand since the 19th century. Researching our historical novels, “Beads on a String” and “Dark Karma” we took a detailed look at the Thai love-hate relationship with gambling.

Gambling: A Thai Tradition

Gambling scene in the late 18th century from the book Thai Society, the reign of King Rama V - Fine Arts Department

Dating back more than two centuries, casinos, along with brothels and opium dens, were popular entertainment places in many towns. In the villages, people bet enthusiastically on rural games such as buffalo races, Thai boxing, and fights between bulls, cocks, fish and even crickets.  For much of Thai history, gambling was an integral part of Thai culture. The arrival of large numbers of Chinese immigrants only widened the array of gambling games and increased the number of gamblers. A lottery, known in Chinese as the “Huai,” was officially established in 1835 as a way to extract revenue from the migrants who were not taxed or subject to the corvee labor system.

Regulating Gambling

Facing the threat of colonization in the late 19th century, however, the Siamese government sought to show the colonial powers that the country was “civilized,” and that gambling, along with other popular vices, was under control. At the same time, the cost of reforming the administration and modernizing the country created a need for new sources of funding.

In 1902, the government brought most types of gambling under official control. The initial intent was not to suppress gambling, but, as in the current “entertainment complex” plans, to steer the flow of gambling money into government coffers. Casino concessions were farmed out to the highest bidders, usually Chinese businessmen. Under these profit-minded entrepreneurs, state gambling revenues reached an all-time high in 1906.

Shutting Down Gambling Dens

Concerns about the loyalty of the southern provinces led the government to order a reduction in the number of casino concessions permitted in the south. Under High Commissioner Chaophraya Yommarat, the casinos in Monthon Nakhon Srithammarat were the first to be shut down. Exceptions, however, were made for gambling on key holidays. Casino operators had to pay for licenses for such holiday gambling. Former casino concession owners used these exceptions and their understanding of the business to establish underground gambling dens.

For the rising middle class and newly aggressive newspapers, gambling was a social ill that broke up families and pushed gambling addicts into poverty. Newspaper editorials and sharp political cartoons excoriated the fluctuating and confusing gambling regulations. The government responded by ending the Huai lottery in 1916, and withdrawing the last of the gambling concessions the following year.

Making gambling illegal opened opportunities for criminal gangs, as shown in our tale, “Dark Karma.” It also provided lucrative payoffs for police and other officials but nothing for the state treasury. The state hungered for its piece of the gambling pie. In the Sixth Reign, several official or semi-official lotteries were authorized to raise funds for various laudable purposes: to construct a navy ship, to finance the Red Cross, to buy arms for the Wild Tiger Corps, and to support other royal projects. In 1917 a lottery financed the Siamese forces sent to fight in Europe. After a dozen years in which government policy fluctuated, the Gambling Act of 1930 officially outlawed almost all types of gambling.

Seeing the Benefits of Gambling

Following the coup that ended the traditional monarchy in 1932, gambling policy changed again. The leaders of the People’s Party (Khana Raat) saw gambling as a way to generate enthusiasm for democracy, legalizing betting on the annual “Constitution Celebration Day.” In 1934, a lottery generated revenue needed to cover a shortfall in government finances. A year later, the government amended the 1930 act to allow a long list of gambling games—if licensed by the Interior Ministry.

Ceramic betting tokens used in Thai gambling dens. They often had Chinese characters.

After another military coup in 1938, the regime of Prime Minister Pibulsongkhram used gambling as a means of promoting the “modern attitudes” he espoused. The Pibulsongkhram government opened a casino in 1939 in the resort town of Hua Hin, but soon had to shut it down due to mismanagement.

In 1945, to raise funds to recover from the war, the government of Prime Minister Khuang Aphaiwong opened casinos in Bangkok and five other provinces. Newspaper reports of the casinos leading gamblers to financial ruin and even suicide, however, led the government to close them down after less than three months.

The Desire to Gamble

Since then, government policy has banned casino gambling but allowed betting on horse racing and the government lottery. It has become clear that these two gambling operations fail to satisfy the Thai thirst for the thrill of a bet or the government's need for revenue. Illegal casinos, underground lotteries, and online betting have blossomed, lining the pockets of criminals and corrupt officials but contributing nothing to state coffers.

In his classic novel “Four Reigns,” M.R. Kukrit Pramoj presents this dialog between his main character Ploi, and her husband:

“Gambling places were allowed at one time,” Ploi said. “Then they were banned, and if you got caught, you could be sent to jail. Now they’re back to being legal and respectable again. Why, Khun Luang? What’s the reason for the change? Which government was right, which wrong?”

“The world turns and turns, Mae Ploi. The pendulum swings. Let us enjoy our roast duck.”

Now, yet another turn, another swing of the gambling pendulum, is on the way.

Our historical novels “Beads on a String” and “Dark Karma” give vivid accounts of gambling in southern Siam more than a century ago. They are available on the River Books website and on Amazon.com.

Anand Panyarachun and the Making of Modern Thailand - book review (Copy)

Note: We are reposting this review, originally written in 2019, because it was accidentally deleted from the website.

This biography of Anand, the first in English, is Anand Panyarachun and the Making of Modern Thailand by long-time Bangkok journalist, Dominic Faulder. The outcome of six years of work, the book covers Anand’s life and work as diplomat, prime minister, company chairman, philanthropist and contributor to national and international reform. As the subtitle of the book indicates, Anand’s career also provides an useful lens through which to view the last half century of Thai history. The book includes interviews with many of the key actors in the events that have made modern Thailand. As Faulder notes, “The benefit of writing a book about Anand is that many people are willing to open their doors to talk about him; this kind of access is rare in Thailand.” Sadly, at least eight of those interviewed have since passed away – highlighting the timeliness of Faulder’s work.

Before going further, I should acknowledge that I do not come to this subject without my own experiences and biases. I covered Anand’s surprising nomination as prime minister in 1991 as Bangkok bureau chief for United Press International. A few years later I was part of the group that persuaded Anand to chair the non-profit Kenan Institute Asia and I served for a decade as executive director and later president of the Institute under Anand’s leadership.  I later worked as part of a team of writers supervised by Anand that produced a book on King Bhumibol Adulyadej. I have been friends with Dominic Faulder for many years and more recently became friends with Nick Grossman.

Anand and I with former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1998.

Although I covered parts of Anand’s career and worked closely with him, Faulder’s book gave me new information and greater insight into Anand’s life and character. Faulder has given an accurate picture of a man of decisive rationality and integrity with high standards he set for himself and those working with  him. As the book shows, Anand is a man of great self-confidence and quick decisions. More often than not, even in confusing circumstances, his judgment has been sound. Anand worked in a wide variety of roles in his career. He brought value and concern for the public good to each of them.

Elite has become a term of disparagement, but in many positive ways, Anand was elite. He did not suffer fools easily and was often straight-forward in exposing their foolishness. This is not the easy way to popularity. Although he certainly had enemies, Anand gained public support because most people could see his blunt assessments were intended to serve the public good. They also saw that he recognized the advantages his privileged upbringing had given him and sought to understand and empathize with the lives of ordinary Thais. He was elite without being elitist.

Yuangrat and I chat with Anand and UNC professor Jack Kasarda at a Kenan Institute Asia reception in 2015

Faulder gives a good account of Anand’s early life as a student in England and shows how his personal bonds with fellow overseas Thai students proved valuable in later years as Anand and his friends rose to positions of greater power. The background on Anand’s family and the particular importance of his father Sern is useful in understanding Anand. Sern, the son of a high-ranking official of Mon ancestry, won a King’s scholarship to study in England before being called back to Thailand to serve in the ministry of education, rising to take charge of all the royal schools, to serve as a professor at the Civil Service College and to become the top civil servant in the ministry. After the coup that overthrew the traditional monarchy in 1932, Sern became a  businessman and publisher – precursors of his son’s later occupations.

It is hard to find fault with most of what Faulder has written. It is well-organized, carefully documented and, as far as I can tell, accurate. The faults I find lie in what is omitted, likely due to circumstances beyond the author’s control.

First of all, this is a biography that had both the advantages and the constraints of Anand’s full support and extensive cooperation. It gives little space to his critics and contains nothing embarrassing. It deals very carefully with Anand’s personal life; it is more about what he did than who he was. Faulder gives a brief account of Anand’s courtship and marriage to Mom Ratchawong Sodsee Chakrabandh, a fellow student in England and a descendant of King Mongkut. The book, however, says little about Anand’s long marriage, despite Faulder’s extensive access to Anand and his two daughters.

Similarly, the book fails to shed much light on Anand’s relationship with King Bhumibol Adulyadej. Faulder notes that Anand had numerous meetings with the king, especially during Anand’s two terms as prime minister. He quotes others about the relationship. One friend described Anand as a Bhumibolist rather than a royalist. However, there is little insight directly from Anand. As Faulder states in his author’s note, Anand made it clear that matters discussed privately with the king were off limits for the book. This is understandable, but unfortunate, as Anand’s views of the king could have contributed to a better understanding of a monarch whose long reign has been obscured by unfounded rumors, excessive adulation and excessive blame. Both the king and Anand had minds shaped by extensive early education in Europe that had to deal with the complexities of traditional Thai society. Their discussions of Thailand’s problems must have been interesting.

There is also little account of Anand’s religious thinking. Faulder notes his opposition to making Buddhism the state religion during the development of the 1997 constitution and quotes him as saying “normally I don’t give money to temples.” Since Buddhism is so important in the thinking of many Thais, it would have been useful to learn more.

Many of Anand’s views in the book were familiar from my chats with him at board meetings, dinners or social events, but some were new. For someone often described as part of the traditional elite, Anand’s views are rather untraditional. He rejects the idea of “Thainess” and laments that so many Thais misunderstand their own history – taking pride in the glory of a unitary state that never existed. He refutes the common prejudice of many in Bangkok against the Lao ethnic minority, saying he saw them as intelligent and hard-working. He says he appreciated the writings of Thai “radical thinkers,” including Jit Phumisak, Seni Sawaphong, Khamsing Srinawk and Seksan Prasertkul. He decries the abuses of Thailand’s Lese Majeste law and recommends its reform. As head of a commission on the troubles in Thailand’s far south, he goes against the views of most military and government leaders, recommending more local autonomy, greater respect for Islam and a bigger role for the Malay language as measures to reduce the violence there. At the same time he rejects the idea of a “network monarchy” popular among foreign academics. Faulder says Anand sees this network monarchy as “a convoluted, somewhat obsessive conspiracy theory.”

At 608 pages, Anand Panyarachun and the Making of Modern Thailand is comprehensive and detailed.    It is an important step in addressing the lack of serious English language biographies of leading Thais, but it does more.

Using the life of a significant Thai leader, the book gives us insider accounts of many of the critical developments in recent Thai history. Anand’s career extended to diplomacy, government leadership, private enterprise, reform commissions and charitable work making him an important player in that history. But because the account is tied to Anand, it says little about the impact of change on the people of the countryside, the recurring radical movements, the rise and fall of the Thai communist party and much else. However, it does give us a better understanding of whatever events Anand touched and they were many.  Anand and others contributed hundreds of hours of interviews to the book. This wealth of material provides an understanding of Thai diplomacy during the cold war and Thai efforts to adjust to the new reality after the wars in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In particular there is an inside account of the fiasco of the Mayaguez incident and the contentious departure of US troops from the Thai perspective. The book describes Anand’s role in the Thai effort to readjust its relations with the communist governments in Vietnam and China – suffering the wrath of the conservative Thai military in the process.

The highlight of the book, however, is a detailed account of Anand’s two terms as prime minister. It describes his surprising appointment as prime minister after a military coup in 1991 and the confusing process that led to a second term after a public uprising against an unelected military leader the following year. Faulder sheds light on the relationship between Anand and army commander Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon who appointed him only to see him move against military interests and sideline key generals.

 He details the Anand government’s considerable achievements during those two brief terms. Quite correctly, a share of the credit is given to the ministers that Anand brought into his cabinet. With Anand’s support, those ministers advanced the rights of women, espoused much needed educational reform, improved the telecommunications infrastructure and made Thailand a model for enlightened action against AIDS, saving many thousands of lives.

There is a discussion of Anand’s work to help write Thailand’s 1997 constitution often described as the best of the many constitutions Thailand has had. His well-timed actions against the leaders of the 1991 coup kept Thai military leaders in their barracks and out of politics for nearly a decade.

Somewhat apart from Anand’s story, Faulder also provides inside accounts of publications about King Bhumibol and a long overdue dissection of a travesty of a royal biography, The Revolutionary King by William Stevenson.

Whether read for its insights into the life and work of an important Thai leader or for its account of recent Thai history, Anand Panyarachun and the Making of Modern Thailand is good value. Hopefully it will set the standard for biographies of other significant Thais that are long overdue.

QAnon’s Storm fantasy is a brutal reality in Myanmar

According to the confused conspiracy fantasies known as QAnon, the American military would arrest President Joe Biden and hundreds of other elected government officials, declare martial law, overturn the November election and return the country to the nationalist rule of former president Donald Trump. In QAnon parlance this was “the Storm.”

Although unconnected with QAnon, there has been a Storm in Myanmar that is no foolish fantasy, but a grim, brutal and continuing reality.

Similarities

NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and Gen. Min Aung Hlaing before the coup

Like President Trump, the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, didn’t like the results of their November elections. Those elections gave the civilian National League for Democracy 82 per cent of the vote and strengthened party leader Aung San Suu Kyi in her efforts to reduce the Tatmadaw’s long domination of the country. The political party supported by the military and commander-in-chief Gen. Min Aung Hlaing fared even more poorly than expected.

Like President Trump, the military claimed electoral fraud, but the national electoral commission, like electoral authorities in the United States, rejected those claims. Like the January 6 assault on the US Congress, the Tatmadaw moved to prevent the seating of the newly-elected leadership. Unlike in the United States, however, the Storm in Myanmar was all-too effective.

A Real Storm

Troops arrested Aung San Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint, cabinet ministers, the chief ministers of several regions, NLD politicians, writers and activists. The Tatmadaw suspended telephone and internet access in major cities and shut down the stock market and commercial banks. It began secret trials for those arrested, with a military spokesman alleging bizarre offenses against Aung San Suu Kyi.

The people of Myanmar saw the progress towards democracy and civilian rule over the past five years snatched away from them and they protested. Thousands of people across the country banged on pans, put up signs and marched in the streets calling for a return to the government they elected. The military and the police responded with violent measures to stop them.

Thousands of Myanmar citizens marched in the streets calling for an end to the military takeover

Repression in Myanmar

The UN special rapporteur for Myanmar reported that security authorities killed at least 70 people since the protests erupted. They have arrested more than 2,000 people, with evidence that many of those arrested suffered beatings, torture and execution.

Police fire on people protesting the coup

Videos taken during the protests show police and soldiers beating protesters, destroying property, looting businesses and firing into people’s homes. Amnesty International reported that the Tatmadaw had carried out “systematic and premeditated killings.”

“These are not the actions of overwhelmed, individual officers making poor decisions. These are unrepentant commanders already implicated in crimes against humanity, deploying their troops and murderous methods in the open,” Amnesty said.

Like the call to overturn the elections in the United States, the Myanmar coup appears at least partly motivated to maintain the political power and business interests of one man.

Without the coup,Gen. Min Aung Hlaing was due to retire in July, putting at risk not only his control of the military and the cabinet and parliamentary seats allotted to it, but also his influence over a patronage network that includes two lucrative family business conglomerates. With the coup he has become a virtual dictator.

Bizarre Beliefs

Myanmar’s military believes it has the right to rule

The QAnon “Storm” was based on a bizarre complex of conspiracy theories and political dissatisfaction. The Myanmar “Storm” is based on the bizarre conviction of the Tatmadaw that it is the sole savior of the Myanmar nation and deserves its dominance over a people too stupid for self-rule.

The mob assault on the US Congress led to five deaths. The Tatmadaw’s assault on democracy has already led to far more.

International Impact

The question for democratic countries around the world is what are they willing to do to support the protesters facing the bullets and beatings of the Tatmadaw and seeking a return to democracy.

The UN Security Council expressed for the democratic transition in Myanmar, and call on the Tatmadaw to “refrain from violence, fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and uphold the rule of law.”

Several governments, including the Biden administration, have announced economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Tatmadaw. Sanctions appear to have played a role in the reforms leading to the 2015 elections. The increased dependence of military businesses on international trade and financial linkages may make sanctions even more effective now – but they must be rigorously enforced. China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as Myanmar’s closest neighbors have a particular responsibility despite their own anti-democratic inclinations.

The international stakes in Myanmar have risen from the time when the country was a sleepy tropical backwater of little importance to the rest of the world.

With the Myanmar people’s apparent determination to oppose the military takeover, there is a danger that violence will increase. General strikes are already making an impact. Neighboring countries, Bangladesh, China and Thailand could face an influx of refugees fleeing violence and economic collapse. A successful Myanmar military coup would encourage militarist/nationalist opposition to democracy in other countries and discourage pro-democracy movements in places such as Thailand, Hong Kong, Egypt and Belarus.

The QAnon Storm’s threat to American democracy quickly collapsed before strong American institutions and the US military’s long-standing support for civilian rule. The Storm in Myanmar poses a far more difficult challenge to democracy everywhere.

You Don’t Belong Here, a review

You Don’t Belong Here: How Three Women Rewrote the Story of War by Elizabeth Becker tells an important story and tells it well. Actually, the book tells multiple stories. Most obviously, she recounts the lives and reporting of three iconic female journalists who covered the war in Indochina: Kate Webb, Frances Fitzgerald and Catherine Leroy. In telling their stories, Becker documents the sexist obstacles these three women had to overcome. To background those stories she provides a useful account of the stupidity and cruelty of the war in Vietnam and Cambodia.

Becker brings personal experience to the story. She was herself a journalist covering the war and she knew the three women. But she expands on the public record and her personal knowledge with extensive interviews as well as quotes from the women’s personal letters and journals.

Like the war itself, the three women lived with both heroism and tragedy. All three suffered from the trauma of war, losing colleagues, friends and lovers. Long after the end of the war, their lives were marred by the horrors they had experienced. Webb and Leroy, who did extensive frontline reporting were especially damaged, suffering, like many combat veterans from post-traumatic stress disorder. Although Fitzgerald faced fewer physical dangers than the others, she showed a kind of moral bravery in writing a book that overturned conventional thinking about the war and antagonized high-ranking friends in government.

Their bravery produced accurate, moving and insightful reporting and photography. The book includes a number of Leroy’s stunning photographs of the fighting. It also includes snippets from the reporting of Webb and Fitzgerald. My main criticism of the book is that we don’t get enough of that reporting.  I would have liked to have more analysis of Fitzgerald’s ground-breaking book, “Fire in the Lake,” which I read before first coming to Southeast Asia in 1972. Becker hints at elements of the book that have not held up well, but does not go into detail. More examples of Webb’s frontline reporting would have shown more clearly how the risks she took led to important news stories. Hopefully Becker’s book will lead readers to the books by Webb and Fitzgerald and the website with Leroy’s photographs.

Woven into Becker’s account of the war and the lives of these three women correspondents is their experience of the male chauvinism of many reporters and news organizations. Each of them faced and overcame male resistance to women covering a war. At the same time, they were subjected to double standards critical of their personal lives and pressure for sex from some of the men who were supposed to be their colleagues.

It is gratifying that the work of Fitzgerald, Webb and Leroy, along with many others, such as Dickey Chapelle, Sylvana Foa, Gloria Emerson, Denby Fawcett, Jurate Kazickas, Edith Lederer, Anne Bryan Mariano, Anne Morrissy Merick and Laura Palmer helped change the prevailing male chauvinism in international reporting. Ultimately, more than 400 female reporters and photographers had credentials to cover the war. By the time I went to the Columbia School of Journalism in 1976-7, the majority of my classmates were women. Once I joined UPI, I benefited from the experience and advice of female colleagues including Sylvana Foa and Suzanne Fisher Staples. The prejudice against women may not be gone, but the days when difficult and dangerous news assignments were reserved solely for males are over. My own daughter, Pailin Wedel, has benefited from the pioneering of Webb, Fitzgerald and Leroy, to become a successful photojournalist and documentary film-maker.

I was fortunate to chat with Kate Webb on a few occasions, but she wasn’t interested in talking about herself, so I am grateful to Becker for explaining so much, so well.

“You Don’t Belong Here” is available on Amazon.com.

A website dedicated to the life and work of Catherine Leroy can be found at: https://dotationcatherineleroy.org/en/

Webb’s book, “On the Other Side: 23 Days With the Viet Cong,” is on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/Other-Side-Days-Viet-Cong/dp/0812902785/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=Kate+Webb+23+days&qid=1614742872&sr=8-1

Also worth reading is “War Torn: Stories of War from the Women Reporters Who Covered Vietnam” at https://www.amazon.com/War-Torn-Stories-Reporters-Covered-ebook-dp-B004W3GWS0/dp/B004W3GWS0/ref=mt_other?_encoding=UTF8&me=&qid=1614743070

Fitzgerald’s first book, “Fire in the Lake” can be found at https://www.amazon.com/Fire-Lake-Frances-FitzGerald-ebook/dp/B0028MM2MM/ref=sr_1_2?dchild=1&keywords=Frances+Fitzgerald&qid=1614743196&s=digital-text&sr=1-2

#yuangratandpaulonline #journalism #Vietnam #history

Lessons from the Thai coup of 1991

Thirty years ago today, I was watching television at home when an image of the Thai flag and the sound of martial music replaced the morning news program. It marked Thailand’s 17th attempted coup and set off a string of events that offer lessons today to both military coup-makers and anti-military protesters in Thailand and Myanmar.

The February 23rd coup, like the 2014 coup in Thailand and the 2021 coup in Myanmar, went smoothly, with the arrest of civilian leaders and the quick seizure of all government functions. Just over two years later, however, the Thai coup-leader’s attempt to make his power permanent ended in violence and an ignominious resignation.

What went wrong for the military?

The 1991 coup, which I covered as bureau chief for United Press International, faced little public opposition, in part because the military justified its takeover by citing the alleged corruption of the elected government of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan. Although the military’s own reputation for honesty was little better than the ousted government, coup-leader Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon bought himself some breathing room by promising never to seek political power and by appointing Anand Panyarachun, a respected diplomat, as interim prime minister. Anand ran the country mostly independently of the generals and held new elections. Anand’s performance in office mollified many of those opposed to the coup, but when the military used its money and influence in the 1992 elections to hand Suchinda the prime ministership, the floodgates broke.

Mass protests against Suchinda and his broken promise gathered widespread support even among conservative middle-class urbanites who turned out for what became known as the “mobile phone mob.” The military’s attempt to end the protests with violence led to 52 officially confirmed deaths, many disappearances, hundreds of injuries, and over 3,500 arrests. This over-reaction by the military turned more people against Suchinda and led to King Bhumibol Adulyadej stepping in to demand that both military and opposition leaders stop their activities. Suchinda resigned and Anand was again appointed to lead an interim government holding new elections.

Thai demonstrators gather at the Democracy Monument in 1992 calling for the coup-leader’s resignation

 Lessons learned for the military

Swift seizure of power doesn’t necessarily mean long-term victory. Broken promises and manipulation of elections to put military men in top government positions can lead to continuing unrest and loss of power. We are seeing that now with the continuing protests against Gen. Prayut Chan-O-Cha, the leader of the most recent Thai coup in 2014. Prayut’s government has used arrests and harsh measures against the protesters, but it so far has stopped short of the 1992 level of violence.

In Myanmar, the public reaction to the coup has been faster and fiercer. Widespread public protests and general strikes put the military on the defensive within days of the takeover. The generals seem to realize that violent suppression, like that in 1988 and 2007, could be counter-productive, but there is little in the military’s training or inclinations to stop them from murdering large numbers of protesters if the military feels sufficiently threatened. Like Suchinda, the Myanmar coup-leader, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, has promised an end to military rule in a year, but it appears likely that the general will seek to prolong his hold on power, possibly as an elected president. The Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, should realize that rigging an election outcome in favor of the military-backed political party (overwhelmingly defeated in November 2020) will only lead to more protests.

In 2021 demonstrators in Myanmar demanded the release of NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the return to power of the government elected overwhelmingly in 2020. Like their Thai counterparts, they adopted the three-finger protest salute from the movie Hunger Games.

Lessons for the protesters

The 1992 protests had a clear, common objective: Suchinda’s resignation. The demonstrations were coordinated by committee representing the various groups involved in the protests. The latest protests against the Prayut government, however, have so far failed to settle on a single clear objective and they appear to have little coordination. They have attracted idealistic youth, but not the urban middle class or rural farmers. The appeal has to be broader and more tightly focused on military power.

When the 1992 protests triggered the resignation of Gen. Suchinda, new elections were held and a new, more democratic constitution was promulgated. The Thai military appeared to have stepped back from political power.

The 2005 re-election of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, however, threatened military and conservative power and privilege. Thaksin, a telecommunications billionaire and former police officer, achieved dominance not only in Parliament, but in the police, the judiciary and the independent organizations that were created to ensure good governance. Thaksin, who had graduated from Thailand’s military academy, sought to extend his personal influence over top military promotions instead of working to reform military training and culture to accept civilian control. The military reasserted its dominance with coups ousting Thaksin in 2006 and his sister Yingluck in 2014. The key lessons may be that constitutions and laws will ultimately have little ability to control a military with a monopoly on the use of deadly force if that military sees itself as deserving extensive political power.

Thai protesters in 2020 had three demands to the government and a list of 10 reforms to the monarchy

For Myanmar, the situation for protesters is even more difficult. Although the civilian government under National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi accepted a constitution that entrenched military power, the Tatmadaw could not tolerate even modest attempts to reduce that power. The lesson may be that any efforts to reduce military domination cannot focus only on the roles of the top generals. Somehow reform of military training, recruitment and operations must influence and gradually change the mindset of those in uniform down to the lowest level. Currently, those serving in the military receive no training on human rights, law or their duty to serve the elected government. Most Tatmadaw personnel live in camps that separate them from civilian life with their own housing, schools, business benefits and social interactions. Most officers serve, at least initially, in border units fighting ethnic insurgents where they are taught that the people are their enemies, enemies without rights. It is hard to imagine that top Tatmadaw leaders will change if their subordinates continue to believe their first loyalty is to their commanders not to the Myanmar people.

#Thailand #yuangratandpaulonline #myanmar

Sumatran Shadows: A Family Saga of Indonesian history

Sumatran Shadows is a family memoir that provides a personal account of a critical period in Indonesian history: the final years of Dutch colonial control. Author Peter Janssen is an experienced journalist who is also the descendent of some of the wealthiest and most important of the Dutch colonial plantation owners on the vast island of Sumatra.

Janssen, who spent the first year of his life in Sumatra, is the son of an American woman, Nancy, and a Dutchman, Herbert Janssen. Herbert was the scion of two Dutch business clans started by his great grandfathers, Peter Wilhelm Janssen I and Jacob Theodore Cremer.

Both were successful investors in the profitable tobacco plantations of Sumatra. Peter Wilhelm Janssen made the first Dutch investment in Sumatran tobacco in 1864, listed his Deli Company on the Dutch stock exchange and extracted immense profits from Indonesia without ever visiting the country. When the Deli Company manager fled charges of beating seven Chinese coolies to death, he hired Cremer to replace him. Cremer’s astute and ruthless management made Sumatran tobacco leaf the most popular wrapper leaf for cigars in Europe at a time when cigars were all the rage. Cremer pushed the enactment of the “Coolie Ordinance” that legalized company abuse of laborers in Indonesia. He later served as Dutch minister of colonies and ambassador to the United States.

Descendants of Janssen and Cremer continued to work in Sumatra. Many of them, including Peter’s father, became victims of the Japanese invasion of Indonesia in 1942. They suffered imprisonment and torture before the end of the war brought them back to power and privilege.

Within a decade, however, more than 300 years of Dutch economic dominance was brought to an abrupt end by the Indonesian revolution and the nationalistic rule of President Sukarno. Janssen’s memoir, drawing on diaries kept by his mother, father and uncle, gives a personal picture of the confusion and violence of the Indonesian struggle for independence and the expulsion of the Dutch from Indonesia in 1957. Peter, only one year old, was among the thousands of Dutch citizens forced to leave their homes and businesses. For his father, already damaged by his experience in the Japanese prison camps, the expulsion was a blow from which he never recovered.

Janssen’s mother’s writing is particularly moving for its attention to the details of life in Sumatra and its easy eloquence. Amidst the turmoil of Sukarno’s reign, she wrote:

“I am not only happy, I am actually in harmony with something here, something vital to me even if I cannot find words to describe it … It has to do with an intrinsic goodness peculiar to what I think of when I refer to the lasting Indonesia—it is a truth beyond all the surface layers of truth.”

Janssen does a good job of quoting from objective histories to provide factual background to the family’s experience. He is clear-eyed about his forebears’ culpability for the suffering of Indonesian workers, especially in the early years of the plantations.

Janssen blames the loss of the family fortune and the experience of the war for his father’s decline into alcoholism and his parents’ divorce. After the expulsion from Sumatra Herbert relocated the family to another tropical island, Grenada, but his attempt to start a construction business made little headway. Despite his own drinking and philandering Herbert was intensely jealous of Nancy. After a heated argument in 1966, she took the children and returned to the United States. Three years later Herbert died after being stabbed by his girlfriend’s brother in a drunken brawl.

This is not a story of light and happiness, either for Indonesia or the Janssen family, but it is suffused with love for Peter’s mother who bravely committed to a marriage with an odd Dutchman who brought her to a far-away country. Nancy writes movingly of her Indonesian friends and life in Sumatra and Grenada. It is gratifying that she went on to a career as a music teacher and finally found love and stability in a long and happy marriage to a fellow teacher.

Peter provides the final words to the story with his account of visits to Sumatra in 2003 and 2015 when he was a journalist for the German news agency DPA. He finds his old family home and interviews the managers who worked for his family companies after their seizure by the Indonesian government.

For those interested in Indonesia and enjoy history with a human face, this is a factually informative and emotionally fulfilling read.

Sumatran Shadows is available as a paperback on Amazon.com for $4.56.

#Indonesia #yuangratandpaulonline #memoir

Dragging Myanmar Back to Its Repressive Past

The military’s seizure of absolute power in Myanmar this week reflected the country’s legacy of repression and military dominance that dates back to the overthrow of an elected government in 1962. Launched to prevent representatives elected in November from taking their seats, the latest coup by the already powerful military shattered the fragile façade of democracy maintained since 2010. The arrests of State Councilor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint and many other civilian leaders follows an old army playbook for suppressing popular leaders.

The coup was triggered by the abject flop of the military’s own political party in the elections and led to the arrest of most of the candidates who won the elections. It followed the script for army actions set in 1990 demonstrating how little the military has learned or evolved since then.

Elections overturned in 1990

The Myanmar armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, in 1990 allowed the first democratic elections in 30 years, apparently believing its own propaganda that it was loved and respected by the people. A new civilian political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), however, decisively defeated the military party. Led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of one of the country’s independence heroes, the NLD won 392 of the 492 seats.

Instead of honoring the elections as promised, the Tatmadaw immediately re-arrested Aung San Suu Kyi and all of the NLD politicians it could find and simply continued to administer the country as a military dictatorship. That dictatorship continued for another two decades as Myanmar, despite its rich natural resources and talented population, fell further behind its neighbors in health, education and economic development.

This week the Tatmadaw once again refused to accept an NLD victory. In November the NLD won 258 of the 330 seats in the House of Representatives while the military party won only 26 – a humiliating defeat. The NLD also dominated elections for state and local bodies.

NLD loyalists hold a picture of party leader Aung San Suu Kyi during the 2020 election campaign

Why now?

This NLD victory threatened an increase in civilian power despite a constitution carefully designed by the military to preserve its power and economic privileges. It also appeared to be a setback to the ambitions of Army Commander-in-Chief Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, due to retire in July this year. Some believe the general wanted to maintain his current influence or even become president after retiring. That ambition was put in jeopardy by his strained relations with NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi, whose hand was strengthened by the election outcome. Continuing as commander-in-chief without interference from the pesky NLD, Ming Aung Hlaing controls the army along with as the national police, intelligence agencies and pro-government militias. The coup puts the 65-year-old general in a position to order a new election next year and stage-manage its results, possibly paving the way to the presidency.

Even if the speculation about Ming Aung Hlaing is true, it is unclear why other senior military officers went along with him when their power was already enshrined in the constitution. That constitution allocated 25% of the seats in the House of Representatives to unelected military officers and gave them automatic control of three of the most important government ministries. By ousting the NLD and the elected legislature they will now have to take responsibility for running a country deeply divided by political and ethnic conflicts and suffering from the economic and human cost of the Covid pandemic.

The “Burmese Path to Socialism”

There is, however, a long history of the Tatmadaw’s belief in its own superiority and its disdain for the Myanmar people. The military first seized power in 1962 under General Ne Win. That began nearly 30 years of military repression and mismanagement of the economy under Ne Win’s “Burmese Path to Socialism.”

Ne Win’s “socialism” was a sleepy system of nepotism with most of the economy controlled by bureaucrats careful to do as little as possible. Government shops had long lists of products, but most were unavailable unless one had connections or the money to offer a little bribe. It was a system described by the saying "ma lok, ma shot, ma pyot," meaning "No work, no responsibility, no sacking."

Under Gen. Ne Win, life in socialist Burma was both primitive and tightly controlled by the military party.

In ethnic Burman areas political order was maintained by local committees who had authority over the details of ordinary life including travel, business and housing. U Chit Tun, the well-informed UPI correspondent in Rangoon in the 1970s and 80s once told me it was “George Orwell’s Big Brother in a longyi (the traditional Burmese sarong).” In the ethnic minority areas, political order was maintained by brutal army operations against ethnic group armies sometimes funded by drugs and smuggling.

Brutal suppression in 1988

This repression, mismanagement and often bizarre policies espoused by the deeply superstitious Ne Win led to massive protests in 1988. The army brutally suppressed those protests, killing some 3,000 people and imprisoning 3,000 others. At least 10,000 people, many of them students, fled to Thailand. Deeply suspicious of education, the army shut down all of the country’s universities for years. As the UPI bureau chief in Bangkok at that time, I covered the violence and repression. The unrest forced Ne Win to give up power to a new generation of officers. Those officers, however, sought only to improve economic management while continuing political repression with widespread arrests and torture.

Burmese soldiers attack a student demonstration in 1988.

I vividly recall a reporting trip to Myanmar in 1989 in which the Tatmadaw sought to convince visiting journalists that the authorities were not torturing and killing their political prisoners. The army intelligence colonel who accompanied us showed no embarrassment in explaining why the Tatmadaw had to stay in control. The people, he said, are too stupid to understand what is good for them. With such an ignorant population and so many ethnic divisions, only the Tatmadaw, he said, could maintain the country’s unity and independence.

Burmese officers welcome Western journalists they hoped to convince that the army was not mistreating prisoners

When Tatmadaw fantasies of election victory by a military-backed political party were shattered by outcome of the 1990 elections, the military simply ran the country by diktat. Rumbling dissent, including protests in 1996 and harshly suppressed demonstrations by Buddhist monks in 2007, along with further economic decline finally led to the 2010 decision to allow elections under the Tatmadaw-designed constitution. The thinking seemed to be “let the civilians try to solve the problems while we maintain power and privilege without responsibility under a thin veneer of democracy.

What now?

With the 2021 coup, the Tatmadaw’s decade-old plan is now up for a rethink. Their problem is that even that thin veneer gave hope to many. The civilian administration, as limited and flawed as it was, expanded freedoms, opened up the country and improved the economy. Despite security limitations people were freer to travel both inside and outside the country. Despite army repression, independent journalism expanded. Despite army cronies’ dominance of the economy, people were better off. The Internet and social media gave the people of Myanmar access to a world of information and opinion for the first time. Reports from Rangoon say that citizens are banging pots and pans every night to show their anger at the Tatmadaw. Noisy nights are unlikely to bother the generals very much. They have the soldiers and the guns to suppress any more overt dissension, but past uprisings have shown that the army may struggle to keep the lid on permanently.

Despite everything working against them, the people of Myanmar have had at least a taste of democracy and relative freedom. They will not submit willingly to more years of military domination. Large demonstrations against the military takeover in the last few days demonstrate how little support the generals have. However much the Tatmadaw may want to return to the days of the military’s absolute dominance, it may not be so easy to drag the people of Myanmar back to the past with them.

A Tale of Two Countries’ Covid Response

As an American living in Thailand I have puzzled over the fact that Thailand has so far outperformed the United States in its handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. This was also true during the 1918-1920 Spanish Influenza pandemic, a crisis we will explore in Book 2 of our historical novel series, “Beads on a String.” Thailand, although seriously affected, had fewer deaths as a percentage of the population than the United States and Europe despite rather primitive public health and medical capabilities.

Throughout my 19 years with the Kenan Institute Asia (KIAsia) the institute facilitated the transfer of US expertise on public health to Thailand. Already competent Thai officials looked up to American experts as mentors. After the spread of Avian Influenza in 2004, for example, KIAsia worked with Thai and US experts to hold trainings on preparing for the next pandemic. When the Covid pandemic arrived last year, however, the student did far better than the teacher.

Why? What are the factors that allowed one country to protect its citizens much better than another. Is it type of government? Size? Level of development? Culture? Wealth?

The Lowy Institute in Australia recently released an interactive report that seeks to answer some of these questions. You can find it at: https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/covid-performance/?fbclid=IwAR24PbO_h5pWnlG-LFtiK1IllcExkJ14LfCDREQdGMTv4qpBul-RSFvsLJw

Fourteen-day rolling averages of new daily figures were calculated for confirmed cases, deaths, cases per million, deaths per million, cases as a proportion of tests and tests per thousand people.

They ranked the effectiveness of each country for which this data was available (notably, China did not provide sufficient data). A score of 100 shows a country achieved the best average score. A score of 0 indicates that a country had the worst average score at a given moment.

The chart below compares the United States and Thailand:

Although the US has more resources and medical expertise than Thailand, it handled Covid much worse.

Thailand’s score dropped after about two weeks following its 100th case, but then rapidly improved by week 8 and maintained a high score through 36 weeks. The US score did the reverse, dropping quickly after the first two weeks and failing to improve much after that.

With an overall score of 84.2, Thailand came out in the top five in the world. The Lowy institute provided the following chart of the best performing countries:

While New Zealand and Cyprus are small, Vietnam and Thailand have populations of more than 70 million.

Despite its wealth and highly developed medical expertise, the United States had an average score of 17.3, only slightly better than Iran. Here are the worst-performing countries in the world, according to the Lowy Institute:

Except for Iran, all the worst-performing countries are in the Americas.

Response by region also showed significant differences, with Asia and the Pacific, with an average score of 58.2, doing a better job of controlling the outbreak than Europe-51.0, with the Americas, both north and south-33.8, falling even further behind.

Why?

The institute looked at a number of factors that might explain the differences. It concluded that no single type of government was a clear winner. Individual countries varied far more than broad categories of countries based on their type of government. Democratic countries did fare best with an average score of 50.8, but that was only slightly better than authoritarian countries that had an average score of 49.2. Hybrid governments, presumably including Thailand, scored lowest at 41.6. The Lowy Institute report said no single political theory convincingly explained the differences in national outcomes.

The report, however, noted that smaller countries (with populations of fewer than 10 million people) proved more agile and effective than most larger countries. Differences in economic development and differences in political systems had far less impact. The relatively low tech nature of the most effective responses in the first year of the pandemic (social distancing, mask-wearing and hand-washing) presumably allowed even relatively poor countries to do as well as far richer countries. Even technology-dependent actions such as contact tracing depended more on effective government organization at the local level rather than advanced technology, allowing some developing countries, such as Thailand, to succeed.

The Lowy study suggested there was merit in the argument put forward by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama, who said effective Covid crisis response did not depend on regime type, “but on whether citizens trust their leaders, and whether those leaders preside over a competent and effective state”.

In the US, of course, much has been made of the mixed response and confusing messages from the Trump administration. In Thailand, another country with sharply divisive politics, political leaders stumbled initially, but then allowed the public health professionals to orchestrate the coronavirus response and messaging. That decision won public trust appears to have paid off in fewer infections and deaths.

The Lowy Institute report said that Covid responses varied over time. After the first wave of infections, it said, Europe “registered the greatest improvement over time of any region.” But then both Europe and the Americas succumbed to a second, more severe wave of infections in the final months of 2020. Thailand too is suffering from another wave of Covid infections, but so far it is far less serious than in the Americas and Europe.

The Lowy Institute did not mention it, but my guess is that another, rather subjective, factor has been at work: social and cultural cohesiveness. The Asian countries that have dealt effectively with Covid, even those like Thailand that have serious political conflicts, have societies that are willing to follow reasonable recommendations by their leaders.

In Thailand, at least, it seems that mask-wearing quickly became a social norm that showed one’s care for the well-being of others. Unlike in the United States, there was no anti-mask movement in Thailand. There were no claims that shut-downs and social distancing were violations of civil rights. Response to the virus was not politicized. There were no Covid parties by young people who felt they were not at risk. Although there were isolated cases of people ignoring social distancing and mask requirements at boxing matches and illegal casinos, there has been general condemnation of such behavior as anti-social.

Unfortunately, the Covid-19 pandemic is far from over, with record levels of infections and deaths continuing in several countries. Dealing with changes in the virus, securing vaccine supplies and inoculating sufficient numbers of the population are serious challenges, but all countries should be trying to understand what has worked elsewhere if they hope to face those challenges effectively.

#beadsonastring #siam #Thailand #histricalnovel #Chulalongkorn #publishingindustry #bookmarketing #yuangratandpaulonline #gambling #Covid #Thailand

Thailand's Historical Addiction to Gambling

In recent weeks illegal gambling has again gotten official attention in Thailand. Public health officials determined that illegal gambling dens sparked a sudden resurgence in Covid-19 infections. The national police hurriedly announced an investigation to identify the owners and masterminds behind illegal gambling dens. Former Finance Minister Korn Chatikavanich, said legalizing gambling would allow better control of the pandemic and provide the government with significant revenue. Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha set up a committee tasked with overseeing investigations into illegal gambling and announced he will consider legalizing gambling. The key question, he said, was whether Thais could overlook moral strictures against gambling.

This conflict over the morality of gambling is an old one. When King Chulalongkorn came to power in the mid-19th century gambling was legal and the government derived a significant part of its income from gambling concessions that were farmed out to the highest bidder – usually a wealthy Chinese businessman. By the end of his reign in 1910, however, new laws had begun restricting and closing gambling dens despite their wide popularity and ability to generate government revenue.

This issue has a major place in our novel, Beads on a String: a Novel of Southern Siam.

One of our lead characters, a young woman named Ploi, takes over the management of the family’s legal gambling den, only to have new gambling laws implemented first in her home province of Nakhon Srithammarat. Here is an excerpt from the book told from the point of view of a Pakpanang policeman.

“Miss Ploi, I regret to inform you the government has ordered the closure of the Jaikla Casino in accordance with the Gambling Revenue Act of 1902. The provisions of this act provide for…”

“I know the provisions,” Ploi interrupted. “I have been preparing for this order for some time. What I would like to ask is why now? Why here in Nakhon? There has been no action anywhere else in the country. Why Jaikla?”

What should he say? He had prepared a speech explaining the detailed provisions of the act, but was unsure how to answer her questions.

“The Gambling Revenue Act requires the closure of tax concession casinos at the discretion of the chief of police,” he said.

 “So, the police chief, who was gambling here earlier this month, as, if I am not mistaken, were you and several of your men, suddenly decided that it was time to close the Jaikla Casino?”

“It was legal then. Soon it will not be,” he tried to explain.

“So why now? To shut us down before Chinese New Year—our biggest day of the year. How much time can you give us?”

Her direct look was disturbing. He had planned to ask for a bribe to delay the shutdown since his boss had given him a month to close up all the casinos. Being so close to her in the small room he could sense the warmth of her breath. She smelled like coconut and flowers and something earthier. He had volunteered for this assignment because he had been unable to stop thinking of her. He had tried to tell himself this was stupid, that he had to abide by the Five Rules of his yantra—including the rule against other men’s wives.

“It’s not just Jaikla, every casino in the monthon must close when the district police chiefs decide the time is right. I am sorry, but it is the law,” he offered.

She didn’t seem upset, but stood up and looked at him coolly.

“You know the Na Nakhon royal family enjoys outings here, the head of the Chinese merchants’ association and the Nakhon self-help group all come here. Some of them may still have our tokens and they will lose their money if we close before they can redeem them. How much time?”

“A month,” he blurted out. No chance now to bargain for a bribe, but he didn’t care. What he really regretted was that so soon after meeting her, the closure of the casino meant he might never see her again.

Gambling in the reign of King Chulalongkorn.

In the novel, Ploi comes to an arrangement with the policeman that allows her to continue to operate her casino. As she expands her operations, Ploi and her Chinese partner, the former gambling concessionaire, work out another arrangement with senior officials. They agree to allow occasional “raids” on their dens and provide regular “loans” to the officials in return for protection of their expanding gambling empire.

For our account of gambling, we relied extensively on James Warren excellent study, Gambling, the State and Society in Thailand, c.1800–1945.  Warren documents that by the time King Chulalongkorn inherited the throne in 1868, gambling taxes provided 20% of government revenue. The moves to ban gambling came in fits and starts with frequent exceptions, such as the state lottery and horse racing that are still allowed today. However, the biggest obstacle to suppression of gambling is the revenue it generates for corrupt police.  This income has ensured that gambling dens and underground lotteries continue to supply a market demand that has never faltered. As Ploi’s partner says in our story:

“Thai people, from the lowliest fisherman to the wealthiest aristocrat, love to gamble. They have enjoyed this pastime for centuries. Cockfights, bullfights, cricket fights, even fights with fish—all for betting. The people love all the different card games and the cowrie games like Thua and Po. Even poor slaves bet their meager cash on their favorite numbers in one lottery or another. Shutting down the legal gambling dens does not shut down the desire to gamble. In fact, it continues more than ever, but now the government gets no revenue from it.”

Entrance to a legal gambling den about 1900 — a “First Class Gambling House”

Thailand’s Center of Gambling Studies and Center for Social and Business Development reported in 2020 that 57% of the country’s population, or 30.4 million Thais, gambled during the past year. This figure was an increase of 1.4 million since 2017.

As in our novel, there continue to be frequent, well-publicized police raids on illegal gambling dens – some 748 dens were supposedly raided in 2019, yet gambling continues to expand.

In the unlikely event that Gen. Prayut does legalize casino gambling, Thailand will simply be returning to the situation of the 19th century when gambling taxes provided such a big portion of state income.

#beadsonastring #siam #Thailand #histricalnovel #Chulalongkorn #publishingindustry #bookmarketing #yuangratandpaulonline #gambling

Marketing a novel

We are learning that writing is only one part of the job of a novelist. Another job is helping our publisher, River Books, get people to read it. About a million new books were published in 2020, so it is easy for a first novel to get lost in the crowd.

Helping us was the beautiful book cover commissioned by River Books. It was designed by Cover Kitchen, a Bangkok-based company that does nothing but design book covers. Cover Kitchen founder and owner, Xavier Comas says he sought a design that suggested a tone “both melancholic and romantic.”

We had a wonderful book launch party hosted by River Books owner M.R. Narisa Chakrabongse that attracted key booksellers, journalists, authors and friends. We had a chance to talk about the book. Many of the questions were about how we decided on the story line and how we worked together as married co-authors. It was great to engage with potential readers. We look forward to doing that again at the Bangkok Edge Festival, the Foreign Correspondents Club, the Rotary Club and possibly some Thai book stores.

We had a great turnout for our book launch party at the beautiful Chakrabongse Villas.

We also need to attract sales online through the website of River Books and various bookshops. To help do this we have come up with a fuller promotional piece for the book we thought our followers might like to read. This may be altered to fit the requirements of different vendors, but here is the draft as of today:

An epic saga of ambition, love, violence and political intrigue,  Beads on a String is set among wrenching changes in the exotic world of southern Siam. Beginning in 1896 as the reign of the powerful King Chulalongkorn nears its end, the novel is based on true family stories, intermingling historical and fictional characters:

A young Muslim Malay unjustly convicted of rape, reinvents himself as a Siamese aristocrat in royal service. He faces the cultural challenges of his new identity while trying to forestall a Malay rebellion and stave off the colonial powers that have already taken over all of Siam’s neighbors.

A beautiful young Thai woman seizes control of the family casino, defying bans on gambling and the efforts of a competing Chinese secret society. She strives  against the indifference of her father and the schemes of her older brother.

A guilt-ridden Thai-Chinese sailor seeks enlightenment and purpose as a wandering Buddhist monk. He sets up a new kind of Buddhist temple that tries to clear Buddhism of the overlays of myth and superstition found nowhere in the original teachings of the Buddha.

A former slave fights to escape the domination of a Chinese gangster and rise in the increasingly powerful police force. At the same time he remains a slave of his obsessive love for the casino owner and his faith in magical symbols.

The authors weave together these tales and others with exciting storytelling, unforgettable characters and vivid historical detail. Different concepts of family ties and obligations clash as the key characters attempt to form alliances based on sexual passion, revenge and power.

Some initial reactions:

“This family saga of ambition, identity and love in turn-of-the-century Siam is spellbinding,” – Suzanne Fisher Staples, award-winning author of Shabanu.

“Profound, sensitive and attuned to cultural gravitas, Beads on a String captures a sense of historical urgency during a momentous period in Siam.” – Kong Rithdee, leading Thai author and critic.

“While much of the book is indeed fiction, history buffs will be pleased with the insights it provides on King Chulalongkorn’s subjugation of the provincial areas under central, Bangkok administrative rule, overturning the looser semi-autonomous system of the past. Cultural and societal scars still remain from this period, most strikingly in the ongoing Pattani rebellion, reignited in 2004, that has claimed 7,000 lives over the past 16 years.” –  Peter Janssen, reviewer for Nikkei Asia

 Does this interest you in reading the book? Let us know.

Beads on a String is already available at the following Thai bookshops: Kinokuniya, Asia Books and Open House. It can also be purchased online at the River Books website (http://www.riverbooksbk.com/index.php/luangprabanglovestory-189-detail.html). Deliveries to bookstores in neighboring countries should come early in the new year with countries further away getting the book a bit later. Publication of an ebook version will follow.

#beadsonastring #siam #Thailand #histrical novel #Chulalongkorn #publishingindustry #book marketing #yuangratandpaulonline

Launching "Beads on a String"

Yuangrat and I celebrated the publication of our historical novel "Beads on a String" on Thursday. We had a wonderful turnout of friends, family, writers, artists, academics and booksellers.

We enjoyed a lively discussion of the book. Questions ranged from our motivations to write it and the politic conflicts of the time to the love triangle in the story. We explained that the lead characters went against the stereotypes of passive Thai women and aristocratic Thai officials. We explored the theme of identity in a fast-changing society with several main ethnic groups having very different cultures.

We benefited from a gorgeous cover design by Xavier Comas, a Bangkok-based, award-winning book cover designer. Crucial to the flow of the book was the meticulous editing by Nick Grossman and the personal attention of publisher M.R. Narisa Chakrabongse.

Our daughter Pailin did a great job introducing us and moderating the discussion. Our publisher, M.R. Narisa Chakrabongse said she wanted to offer the book because it offering an emotional story of identity and family ties backed by careful historical research. She also provided a wonderful southern Thai themed party with delicious southern food and a special coconut-flavored cocktail.

Yuangrat and I with Pailin and publisher M.R. Narisa Chakrabongse at the start of our book discussion

The launch party was enhanced by the venue, the elegant, riverside Chakrabongse Villas and the full moon view of the Temple of the Dawn just across the river from the Villas.

We want to thank everyone who came and contributed to the success of the evening. The book is now available on the fiction page of the River Books website at https://www.riverbooksbk.com/index.php/fiction.html and in Bangkok bookstores. It will soon be on sale around the region. An ebook version will be available in the first quarter of 2021.

#beadsonastring #history #yuangratandpaulonline #writers #siam #novelwriting

Selling a book by its cover

You may not be able to tell a book by its cover, but a good cover helps sell it.

When Yuangrat and I were writing Beads on a String: A Novel of Southern Siam we spent little time thinking about one of the keys to getting people to buy it: the cover. We should have known better because we spent weeks working with a designer to create the cover for our 2019 book, “Radical Thought, Thai Mind” and I am not sure the final rather conceptual design has been good for sales.

Fortunately, once River Books decided to publish Beads they contacted Cover Kitchen, a Bangkok-based company that does nothing but design book covers. I asked Cover Kitchen founder and owner, Xavier Comas about his approach to cover design.

“For an historical novel we started by trying to understand the essence of the book and then do research on that period,” Comas said. “We want to understand what people wore, how they looked and what was going on back then.”

“The most important thing is to set the tone of voice, partly through the concept, but also through the  execution,” he said. This tone, he said, has to be specially conceived to fit each book.

For Beads on a String, he said he was looking for “a tone that was both romantic and melancholic,” that evoked a sense of time past. Given that one of the most powerful characters in the story is a young woman, Comas said, the key was finding the right image of the right woman for the cover.

“We spent many hours searching for her,” he said. “She had to look attractive and Thai, but also determined, even a little bit dangerous.”

 Yuangrat and I tried  to help by suggesting period photographs like this one, but they seemed stiff and not quite right.

This was one of the stock historical photos we suggested that Comas rejected.

Comas and his team also had difficulties. Most of the modern photographs they found were of sweetly smiling young women who didn’t fit with the strong-minded heroine of our tale. He said he tried taking some original photographs with a model, but he wasn’t satisfied.

“We had to dig deeper,” Comas said. So he continued searching through websites and photographs until finally he found the right image.

“I was totally blown away by her,” he said.

Comas then wanted to bring in other elements of our saga, which has six main characters and explores several different themes. But, he said, too many images on the cover would make it look cluttered and confused. In the end, he chose images of a Chinese junk and a southern Thai river because they suggested the location of the story, the Thai-Chinese cultural clash that is one theme, and the central role a sailing junk plays in the plot.  

Then the team had to meld the woman, the junk and the river together into a unified image. To suggest that this was a story of the past, Comas added a texture like hand-made paper to the combined images.

“We also chose a font from the end of the 19th century for the title and gave it a color taken from the sail of the junk that is also one of the classic colors of traditional Thai art,” Comas said.

The final touch was to add a string of Buddhist prayer beads to the back cover.

Comas said he used Photoshop software to combine the images, balance the colors and establish the texture. The final image, he said, has 40 layers.

Yuangrat and I love the cover design and we hope others will too.

This was the final design by Xavier Comas, along with a jacket blurb by editor Nicholas Grossman and comments by authors Suzanne Fisher Staples and Kong Rithdee.

I asked Comas how many book covers he has designed in his career and was startled when he said “thousands.” He explained that he works with a team that in an average month produces some 60 to 70 covers. “I have been doing this for over 30 years,” he said, “so do the math.”

That experience, along with Comas talent as a photographer and writer of a book about Thailand’s deep south (The House of the Raja) made him the perfect designer for our book cover.

The book launch for Beads on a String is set for the evening of December 3 with a party at the elegant Chakrabongse Villas on the Chao Phraya River just across from the Temple of the Dawn. Yuangrat and I will talk a bit about the book and sign copies. If you would like to attend this launch party, email us at PWedel@gmail.com and we will send you an invitation.

#beadsonastring

History weighs on October protests in Thailand

As opponents of Thailand’s military-backed government launch another round of protests this month, memories of past Octobers lie heavily on the country.

Most obvious are the protests of October 14, 1973 that ended a military dictatorship and the protests of October 6, 1976 that led to a brutal, right-wing massacre of student protesters and a military coup. Also heavy on the hearts of many Thais is the October 13, 2016 death of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the country’s longest-reigning monarch.

A ceremony commemorating the people killed by police and a right-wing mob on October 6, 1976

The protests set for October 14 are a reminder of the 1973 demonstrations that led to the flight of military dictators who had once, like the current leaders, seemed all-powerful. Similarities abound, as we wrote in an earlier blog (Thai arrests and protests recall a violent past-Aug 9, 2020), but there are important differences, including:

Timing

The Covid-19 pandemic has created economic difficulty and uncertainty. The government has claimed credit for Thailand’s relatively successful handling of the pandemic even though the main contribution of the top leaders was to stay out of the way of the public health professionals. At least some Thais sympathetic to the protesters believe this is not the time to add political unrest to the health and economic challenges the country already faces.

Government handling

The government of Gen. Prayuth Chan-O-Cha, first brought to power by a 2014 military coup, has handled the resurgence in political protest more carefully than the 1973 generals. While some protest leaders have been arrested, they have, so far, been allowed bail. In contrast, the 1973 government rejected bail for those arrested, sparking widespread anger. Prime Minister Prayuth has issued a few warnings, but has left dealing with the protests to the police and the courts in contrast to the dictators who took a personal role in suppressing the 1973 demonstrations. A new round of arrests Tuesday, however, shows that this careful approach has come up against government’s concerns that the protests will impact the monarchy.

The monarchy

In 1973, the protesters saw King Bhumibol Adulyadej as a voice of calm and reason. They respectfully sought his guidance. This may have led to the king’s later role in urging the dictators to leave the country. In 2020, however, the monarchy has become the target of at least some of the protest leaders. They want to reform of the new financial and military powers held by current monarch, King Maha Vajiralongkorn, but not by his revered father. Demonstrations on October 14 were planned so King Maha Vajiralongkorn would see the protests as he travels to a scheduled appointment. On Tuesday, however, police arrested 19 protesters who had set up tents along the king’s planned route. Police claim they are worried that pro-monarchy counter-demonstrators will clash with the protesters and spark the kind of violence that erupted on October 6, 1976.

Army factionalism

It is often overlooked, but the success of the 1973 demonstrations owed much to factions in the army upset by the stranglehold the dictators tried to maintain on the top army positions. The government’s fate was sealed when Deputy Army Commander Krit Sivara refused orders to bring provincial troops into the capital to crush the protests.

While factionalism still exists in the Thai army, this month’s annual round of military promotions has installed more conservative commanders in key positions. According to Paul Chambers, a military analyst at Naresuan University, “the country’s crisis in 2020 is not only a showdown between students and arch-royalist aristocrats. It’s also a pivotal flashpoint where the military is becoming increasingly disunited. Most of its leadership in 2020 is composed of more reactionary officers willing to quash student demonstrations.”

Preparations and fears

Fortunately, there are also differences from the October 1976 bloodshed. The violence against the demonstrators at Thammasat University was the culmination of at least two years of efforts to rouse and manipulate violent political emotions. The victory of communist insurgencies in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam had made it easier to cultivate an atmosphere of fear and hysteria among ordinary Thais.

The military’s political arm organized nationalistic village groups and transported them to Bangkok to join police in attacking the student demonstrators. A key element of the right-wing propaganda, spread by the military’s near monopoly control of radio and television, was the threat to King Bhumibol. This threat was overblown, but not irrational. The Lao Communist insurgents who seized power in 1975 had forced the King Sisavang Vatthana to abdicate. (He was later arrested and sent to a ‘re-education camp’ where he died.)

In 2020, however, there are no realistic threats to the king. The Communist governments of the region are no longer seen as threats. The military does not appear to have carried out the kind of preparations that paved the way to their 1976 overthrow of the elected government.

Gen. Prayut talks to the news media.

With Gen. Prayut as prime minister and in control of the Senate and the bureaucracy, there is no reason for the military to do anything against him. In any case, it would not be easy for pro-military and pro-monarchy groups to rouse political emotions as they did to prepare the way for the 2014 coup. As a new king, King Maha Vajiralongkorn has not yet been able to equal his father’s devoted following built by years of service, constant presence and invariably favorable news coverage.

Sorrow and respect

Many Thais spent Tuesday in remembrance of King Bhumibol, who passed away on October 13, 2016. Religious ceremonies were held around the country and many people wore the king’s color yellow as a show of respect. On the throne for 66 years, King Bhumibol traveled extensively in the rural areas of the country, setting up projects and organizations to deal with the difficulties faced by poor Thais. He projected a calm and concerned persona. He was a dedicated family man and rarely went anywhere without his wife or at least one of his children. Throughout the last four decades of his reign he never left the country.

The protesters’ main demands are for a new, more democratic constitution, an end to the military’s political dominance, the resignation of the government and new elections. They have, however, also called for a reform of the constitutional monarchy. This is a demand rarely heard in public.

Hopes for change

The protests of 1973 and, more ominously, of 1976 led to abrupt change. October 14, 1973 brought the resignation of the government, a more democratic constitution and new elections. October 6, 1976 brought a military coup, rule by decree, an increase in the military’s political power and an upsurge in violence from the communist insurgency.

The protesters in this October also call for sudden and sweeping change.

“We will bring Thailand back under democracy and return power to the people,” activist Panupong Jadnok told reporters. He cited the sudden overthrow of the absolute monarch in 1932. The ideals of that movement, he said, remain “in the hearts of all democracy-loving citizens.”

A plaque commemorating the 1932 overthrow of the absolute monarchy made by protesters in 2020 to call for the democracy sought nearly nine decades ago, but never fully achieved.

In 2020, however, no such quick changes seem likely. The hopes of the protesters and the threats to the government and the military appear more likely in the long term.

Earlier this month, the government announced that new elections for provincial councils will be held on December 20, after a decade without such elections. The provincial elections, along with voting for municipal and sub-district posts expected next year, will be a test of the government’s popularity and the ability of the opposition to organize effectively.

Demonstrations this year have won support from the educated urban youth who flocked to the Future Forward Party that came in third in the national elections. The courts, however, dissolved the party and banned its leaders on election technicalities. Sitting side-by-side with them in the demonstrations were older, working class followers of the Pheu Thai Party, which won the greatest number of seats in the 2019 national elections. Pheu Thai was kept out of government by the powerful, appointed Senate comprised largely of military officers.

Urban youth and rural and working class poor join a demonstration calling for democratic change.

If opposition parties can survive any further legal attacks, overcome election processes favoring the military and bring these two groups of voters together, they would pose a serious problem for Prayut’s coalition. That coalition, cobbled together with politicians from various parties, is already troubled by factional in-fighting. If the current government cannot stick together, revive the economy and overcome concerns about the power of the military, it may find political opponents gaining many local seats. Those seats could be useful in national elections that must be held by 2023 or sooner if Prayut’s coalition breaks up.

Even the most sweeping opposition election victories, however, would not mean an immediate end to the military’s entrenched political power, but they could be the first steps on a long, difficult road of reform returning power to the Thai people.

Our Novel, Beads on a String, has a publisher

Yuangrat and I are pleased to announce that we have signed an agreement with River Books to publish our historical novel, Beads on a String: A Novel of Southern Siam. The novel tells the story of four families in the coastal cities along the Gulf of Siam that become linked together by love, hate, ambition and tragedy beginning at the end of the 19th century.

We hope readers will enjoy inhabiting our carefully researched recreation of life in the southern provinces at a time of wrenching change. Siam under King Chulalongkorn was then struggling to transform itself from a kingdom of traditional semi-independent states into a modern, centralized nation. The king’s reforms impacted laws, administration, religion and society. This transformation, coupled with the introduction of new technologies, foreign ideologies and pressure from the colonial powers, affected all aspects of life in the south.

King Chulalongkorn driving a car

In two decades, steamships replaced sail, a railroad linked the south to the capital, automobiles competed with  horse carts and elephants, and telegraph lines sped information between the king and his officials in the provinces.

Sailing junk in a storm

Local cultures, once separated by thick forests and difficult transport, mixed and merged, competed and clashed. The families in our tale are Thai, Chinese, Mon and Malay. Their joining together is troubled by misunderstanding, cultural clashes and struggles for identity and success.

While we have worked to keep the story historically accurate, our first priority is to entertain. The story includes troubled romances, storms at sea, family conflict, violent uprisings, political treachery and a religious quest.

Women gambling in Siam around the turn of the century

With the River Books agreement, we have begun working on the formidable task of editing this complex story. We were pleased that River Books appointed Nick Grossman as editor. We are familiar with Nick’s keen sense of narrative and careful editing from working together on the non-fiction King Bhumibol Adulyadej: A Life’s Work.

There is still a lot of work ahead on editing and designing the book. We also look forward to working with River Books to publicize and market novel, which will be available in both paperback and ebook editions, hopefully by the end of the year.

River Books, based in London and Bangkok, has particular expertise in books about Thai history, both fiction and non-fiction. The River Books catalogue includes fiction such as Curtain of Rain and After the Rain by Tew Bunnag, Bangkok in Times of Love and War and Siamese Tears  by Claire Keefe-Fox, Last to The Front by Gee Svasti and The Stairway Guide’s Daughter by John Burgess.

In addition, last year River Books published the translation of Veeraporn Nittiprabha’s SEAwrite-award-winning novel The Blind Earthworm in the Labyrinth.

River Books’ non-fiction histories include Lords of Life: A History of The Kings of Thailand by HRH Prince Chula Chakrabongse, Thailand’s Political History: From the Thirteenth Century to Modern Times by B.J. Terwiel, books on Thai and Southeast Asian archaeology and many books on Thai popular culture.

You can see more about River Books at https://www.riverbooksbk.com/index.ph

We look forward to the publishing process and promise to keep our readers informed as it all moves forward.

Thai arrests and protests recall a violent past

Political protests and arrests in Thailand over the past two weeks look ominously similar to events in the 1970s that triggered terrible violence.

Despite the corona virus pandemic and Thailand’s relative success in handling it, growing protests against the government of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha have heightened political tensions.

The wave of anti-government protests, many held on school and university campuses around the country, called for a new constitution, the resignation of the prime minister, an end to police intimidation and new elections. The protests indicate growing anger against the government of the former army commander who seized power in a 2014 coup and continued in office via an election last year. That election followed constitutional measures and election laws passed while Prayuth ruled by decree that virtually ensured his continued grip on power.

Anti-government protesters gather at Bangkok’s Democracy Monument to call for a new constitution in 2020.

Many young voters were dismayed by the legal maneuvers that led to the dissolution of a popular opposition party and the banning from politics of its charismatic young leader.

Prayuth’s failure to deal effectively with corruption scandals and severe economic problems, due in part to the pandemic, has weakened the government. It is unclear whether a cabinet reshuffle this week that sidelined experienced economic ministers will boost the sagging economy.

Government supporters countered the protests with a small demonstration on Thursday that claimed the pro-democracy movement opposed the country’s constitutional monarchy. Singing nationalist songs and chanting “Long live the King,” the demonstrators held signs calling for the protection of the monarchy. The rally was organized by a group called “Vocational School Students Protecting the Nation.”

Apparently fearful that the anti-government demonstrations would grow, the police Friday arrested two prominent protest leaders and have issued warrants for the arrests of others. Those arrested have been charged with sedition and defying an emergency decree the government insists is needed to combat the corona virus. Critics have charged that the decree was extended this month despite the lack of locally spread infections for more than two months so that it could be used as a weapon against the protesters.

On Saturday, approximately 800 demonstrators gathered in Bangkok to denounce the arrests. Police observing the demonstration retreated after chants for them to leave.

The protests have been peaceful and police have refrained from violent measures to break up the gatherings. The arrests, the emotional allegations of opposition to the monarchy and the involvement of vocational students, however, suggest ominous parallels with the past.

In October 1973, students and democracy advocates began protests against the government of another coup leader who made himself prime minister, Gen. Thanom Kittikachorn. The relatively small and peaceful protests demanded a democratic constitution. The Thanom government responded by arresting the protest leaders. The arrests aroused long-suppressed anger and the protests grew to number some 400,000. Their demands expanded to include resignation of the government and new elections.

Attempts to disperse the crowd led to violent clashes with troops and police that left at least 100 people dead. Army units outside of Bangkok refused to obey government orders to suppress the uprising and, after the intervention of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the three top government leaders fled the country.

Anti-government protesters at the Democracy Monument calling for a new constitution in 1973.

Unfortunately, however, the collapse of the military dictatorship, a new constitution and democratic elections did not lead to peace. Right-wing groups used fears of communism and supposed threats to the monarchy to arouse emotions leading to the assassinations of farmer leaders and leftist politicians. Vocational students organized by elements of the military were active in the conflict.

On October 6, 1976, vocational students, right-wing groups and police, incited by a faked insult to the monarchy, launched an attack on student demonstrators at Thammasat University, murdering at least 46 people. That violence paved the way for a military coup against the elected government and the arrests of hundreds more activists.

Clearly no one wants to repeat this ugly history, but with new protests scheduled for August 16, all sides will have to be careful not to ignite the emotions and violence that tore Thailand apart in the ‘70s. The Prayuth regime, which initially seized power claiming the need to restore political peace, has a special responsibility to show patience, flexibility and respect for democratic rights.

Thailand's Contested History: the anniversary of the end of absolute monarchy

June 24th marks the 88th year since a small group of civil servants and military officers overthrew Thailand’s absolute monarchy, converting it into a constitutional monarchy. The conspirators, calling themselves the Khana Raad, or People’s Party,  struck in the early morning, arresting royal officials and taking control of key military units in the capital. They issued a proclamation alleging the failure of the royal government to solve the problems of the people and promising a new democratic system.

A leader of the 1932 “revolution” announces the end of the absolute monarchy in Siam.

Until 1960 June 24 was celebrated as Constitution Day, a national holiday, but military dictator Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat replaced the celebration of the end of the absolute monarchy with a celebration of the king’s birthday. The date has become yet another point of political dispute over the country’s present and past. Three years ago, the plaque that marked the announcement of the overthrow was stolen and has never reappeared.

Official school history books do not provide much detail on the events of 1932. Some students say their main impression is that the end of the absolute monarchy was premature because the Thai people were not ready for democracy.

Groups opposed to the current military-backed government marked the anniversary with small demonstrations in favor of democracy in several parts of the country. Government officials warned that demonstrators may be arrested for violating strict laws controlling public demonstrations, but no arrests were immediately reported.

A demonstration in front of Parliament House celebrating the 1932 end of the absolute monarchy. The banner calls for the return of a constitution belonging to the people.

Army political power the real target of anniversary demonstrations

Prime Minister Prayut Chan-O-Cha, who has held power since he led a coup overthrowing an elected government in 2014, warned demonstrators not to “cross the line” by criticizing the monarchy. However,  it is not the monarchy, but the politically dominant army that is the real target of most opposition groups.

Activist Parit Chiwarak, the founder of the Student Union of Thailand, told the press he simply wanted to recognize a landmark in Thai history.

“June 24th is a watershed moment in Thai history,” Parit said. “It is where absolute monarchy ended and we welcomed democracy.”

Disputes over the constitution

An important result of the 1932 event was the establishment of a constitution. The document finally delivered was a compromise between power for the people and continuing influence for the monarchy. Eighty-eight years later, the constitution, many versions removed from the original, is again a matter of debate. This constitution currently was developed under the military government installed by a coup. It provides the military with a central role in government and limits the power of elected representatives. It also provides the monarchy with significant influence.

“We want to use the revolt anniversary to make our point about the problematic nature of the current constitution drafted by the military,” activist Anusorn Unno told the Bangkok Post.

Political opponents of the military argue that the current constitution falls far short of the democratic objectives of 1932.

Demonstrators at Parliament submitted a document calling for a new, more democratic constitution. They chanted “Dictatorship shall fall, democracy shall flourish, the constitution must come from the people.”

Revolution or change in administration?

The contrasting views of the anniversary and of democracy itself show that the people of Thailand have not yet come to a common understanding of the complex events following June 24, 1932.

Unlike revolutions such as those in France and Russia, the Thai “revolution” was not led by the underclass or radical revolutionaries, but by high-ranking officials who had differing objectives and ideologies. Some saw the Peoples Party, as delivering a “revolution” that would include radical  social and economic change, while others sought only “a change in administration” to take power from royal relatives they considered incompetent.

If a revolution, it was certainly an incomplete one. It retained the king as a powerful voice in government and allowed conservative royalists to take positions in the new administration.

But it also went beyond  administrative changes. It sparked changes in political thinking that have emphasized the need for “democracy,” and pressured the politically powerful military to hold elections of some sort after most of their 13 successful coups since 1932.

Role of the king

King Prachadipok, last absolute monarch of Siam

Today, some Thais hail the monarch at the time, King Prajadipok, the seventh ruler of the Chakri Dynasty, for giving the people of Thailand a democratic constitution. Others say he had little choice but to agree to the constitution if he wanted to continue to reign.

A year after the end of the absolute monarchy, a high-ranking prince and former minister of war gathered provincial military units and marched on Bangkok. King Prajadipok avoided showing support for either side by departing for the south until the counter-revolution was defeated.

Indirect elections were held soon after, but the king and the new government failed to work out their differences. King Prajadipok abdicated, criticizing the Khana Raad for its authoritarian tendencies. Those tendencies grew stronger over the ensuing years. The Khana Raad failed to evolve into a mass political party or preserve the fragile democracy it had launched. Instead, it split into civilian and military factions that contested for power into the 1940s and 50s when the army smashed the civilian faction, driving many into exile or prison.

Model for more coups

Ever since 1932, the  army has used that first “revolution” as the model for mostly bloodless coups to oust civilian governments its leaders found inconvenient. The opposition has sought to use the democratic rhetoric of 1932 to inspire support for a return to a more truly democratic system.

Unfortunately June 24 remains a symbol of the failure of the Thai people to agree on how they want to be governed and a sign of the power the political past still holds over the political present.

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For a more detailed account of the circumstances, personalities and ideologies of the 1932 events, please see our book Radical Thought, Thai Mind: A History of Revolutionary Ideology in a Traditional Society. It is available as both a paperback and an e-book on Amazon.com.

History of US health assistance upended by Covid-19

For most of the last half century the United States has been, by far, the leading provider of health aid to developing countries. That assistance has helped Thailand and the other nations of Southeast Asia develop effective programs dealing with malaria, HIV-AIDS, pandemic flu and a long list of other diseases. American expertise and financial support have won appreciation and respect throughout the region.

Unfortunately, the seemingly selfish, confused and ineffective effort of the current US administration against the Covid-19 pandemic risks losing that historical good will.

The decision this month to halt funding for the World Health Organization in the midst of a global health crisis has become the bizarre hallmark of Washington’s policy towards international cooperation on the disease. That decision has overshadowed announcements that nearly $500 million has been allocated by the State Department and the US Agency for International Development to fight Covid-19. The halt to funding for WHO comes on top of the administration’s proposal to cut foreign aid by 23% in its 2020 budget, including large reductions to well-regarded programs dealing with AIDS and malaria in developing countries.

Through most of my 19 years with the Kenan Institute Asia, the institute worked closely with USAID to bring American medical and public health expertise to the region. That American assistance was greatly appreciated. Public health authorities throughout the region, even in Communist countries like Vietnam and Laos, learned from and worked with the US Centers for Disease Control, the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases and USAID. The US Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Science maintains a research facility in Bangkok with a staff of more than 400 in partnership with the Royal Thai Army.

Health officials in Laos preparing for a disease outbreak investigation managed by KIAsia and funded by USAID in 2008.

Now, however, there is confusion about American actions and objectives – not only in the region, but in Washington. Press reports this week say USAID officials are scrambling to get details about the halt in US funding for WHO. As recently as April 15, the USAID website touted its partnership with WHO to strengthen medical laboratories in Vietnam under the Global Health Security Program. Aid officials are struggling to find alternatives to WHO, not just for Covid, but for other diseases.

The lack of a USAID member on the White House task force on Covid-19 is one indication of the low priority given to developing country needs. Reports say working-level aid officials have had difficulties getting clear guidance from the administration, delaying urgent work on the pandemic.

In March USAID began cancelling shipments of medical supplies abroad because they were needed in America. Worse, USAID dipped into its disaster relief supplies stored overseas for international crises to send masks, protective clothing and face shields back to the US. The US failure to ensure sufficient domestic supplies may have made these shipments understandable, but the signal to other nations is that the health of the rest of the world is not a priority.

Although the United States is still providing more international assistance on the pandemic than any other country, that is not generally recognized. World attention is focused on the confusing statements from the White House, the US failure to control the disease domestically and the cuts to international assistance.

Two years ago, the journal Health Affairs warned: “If we cut our aid and leave a vacuum, it will be filled by US rivals, starting with China. Chinese foreign aid is growing fast, at an annual rate of more than 20 percent per year, and is rapidly catching up with US assistance.”

Protective equipment provided to Thailand by the United States for the fight against Covid-19

That is exactly what is happening now.

After initial problems in Wuhan, China has won favorable attention for donating protective equipment to countries hard-hit by the virus. Chinese billionaire Jack Ma has added to official donations with some 1 million test kits and 600,000 surgical masks for Africa. Between March 1st and April 4th China exported nearly $1.45 billion of medical supplies to countries in need. Chinese telecoms giant Huawei has already delivered much of its promised 500,000 masks, 50,000 goggles, 30,000 gowns and 120,000 gloves to hospitals in New York.

China has not limited its assistance to equipment, but has also provided expertise, sending doctors and nurses to several countries. As Thailand began its Covid-19 vaccine effort, it looked not to the United States but, as the Bangkok Post reported, to China as a technical partner.

The first team of Chinese doctors and nurses to be sent to Southeast Asia landed in Cambodia on 23 March. The headline in the local paper was “Chinese experts to the rescue”.

China also drew attention to the US cut in funding to the WHO by offering to donate an additional $30 million to the agency.

China’s “coronavirus diplomacy” may be intended to avoid blame for its initial fumbling response to the virus, but Its donations of equipment have contrasted with the US effort to grab international supplies for itself. Just as important has been the apparent success of China’s measures, however belated, to get the pandemic under control. Reports of dropping infection rates in China have contrasted with daily hikes in the number of infections and deaths in the United States. As of April 20, the United States reported 764,000 infections and more than 40,000 deaths compared to just over 82,000 infections and 4,600 deaths in China’s far larger population.

People in Southeast Asia, where the number of infections is far lower, must wonder how the self-proclaimed global leader in health became the country with the most pandemic deaths in the world.

A recent study by researchers at Stanford University found that favorability ratings of the United States increased in proportion to its delivery of health aid. President Bush’s Emergency Plan for AIDS relief and the President’s Malaria Initiative were particularly well received. How will the Covid-19 pandemic affect favorable views of the United States?

Hopefully, the US administration will rapidly improve its response to Covid-19 both in the US and around the world. America’s advanced medical research capability will be crucial to the development of treatments and vaccines against the virus. But to be effective, the US government should not seek to go it alone. Much improved international cooperation will be necessary and that must include cooperation with China. Historical health linkages should make this achievable, but the administration’s mindset of “America First” must be replaced by “People First.”

If nothing else, the Covid-19 pandemic has made it even more obvious that the American people cannot be healthy if the rest of the world is sick. American expertise and financial resources must be shared around the world. That will be good for the world and good for the United States. There is a long way to go before this crisis is over, but a big change in the mindset at the top of the American government will be needed to overcome a disastrous start.

Pandemics in Thai history – reasons for hope and fear

Thailand’s history of dealing with serious disease offers both hope and fear on how it will handle the Covid-19 pandemic.

The 1918 Flu Pandemic

The flu virus, dubbed the Spanish Flu, arrived in Thailand, then called Siam, with Thai soldiers who had fought in Europe in World War I. Most of the 19 Thai deaths in that war were from the disease believed to have begun in a US army camp. In the next two years the flu infected 2.3 million Thais, some 36% of the population. More than 80,000 Thais died, including the heir presumptive to the throne, Prince Chakrabongse Bhuvanath. Like Covid-19, the 1918 flu attacked the lungs, often leading to pneumonia.

Thai troops returning from World War I

As terrible as the death rate in Siam was, it was lower than in the rest of the world, which suffered at least 40 million deaths. The Spanish flu pandemic in Siam sparked the establishment of the Department of Public Health in November 1918. The department later became the Ministry of Public Health that is dealing with the current pandemic.

A century ago, of course, medical science had far fewer weapons to attack disease than it does today. It was not until the 1930s that researchers discovered the pandemic had been caused by a virus.

Recent Pandemic Disease Threats

In the last three decades, Thailand and the rest of the world have dealt with other pandemic threats: HIV/AIDS, first reported in Thailand in 1984, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, Avian influenza A(H5N1) in 2004-2007, and the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in 2016.

While there have been many advances in disease detection, control and treatment, the most important tools are still those used in 1918 – keeping people apart to lower transmission rates and providing clear, consistent and truthful information to the public.

The actions recommended so far against Covid-19 by the Ministry of Public Health appear to be reasonable. This is no surprise. I worked closely with the Ministry during my 19 years at the Kenan Institute Asia. The Institute, with funding from USAID and private donors, helped Thailand with diagnostic tests for AIDS, with malaria containment and with pandemic planning. In my experience most ministry officials were knowledgeable, experienced and public-spirited. Unfortunately, the same could not always be said of the political leadership in ultimate control of the ministry.

The HIV/AIDS Pandemic

This was particularly true for the government reaction to HIV/AIDS. Fearful of the impact on business, successive governments downplayed the problem. Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda, an unelected army general like current Prime Minister Prayut Chan-O-Cha, dismissed AIDS as "just like any other disease."

Throughout the 1980s Thai leaders insisted that HIV/AIDS was limited to drug users, homosexuals and foreigners, even as it spread into the general population. Top leaders said little and did little about HIV/AIDS, apparently worried publicity would damage Thailand’s vibrant tourist industry based partly on cheap sex available at bars and massage parlors. Little attention or budget was devoted to HIV/AIDS even as the death toll rose.

In 1991, however, the government of Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun made dealing with it a national priority. Anand became personally involved as Chairman of the National AIDS Committee. He put Mechai Viravaidya, the minister of the prime minister’s office, in day-to-day charge of the effort. A gifted communicator, Mechai minced no words in warning about the disease and putting in place the means to deal with it. “Because of prostitution, Thailand, like a lot of other countries, is very fertile ground for AIDS,” Mechai said. “A lot of people would like us just to shut up about it.”

Mechai Viravaidya distributes condoms to bar girls to promote safe sex

Fortunately, the colorful Mechai was not one to shut up. He used condom-blowing contests, snappy slogans and cartoons to promote safe sex and compassionate treatment of those infected. Under the two Anand governments significant progress was made in education, testing and treatment of HIV/AIDS, and the spread of the disease slowed. However, even today, some 30 years later, the country is still paying the price for the early fumbling of the AIDS problem. It remains a significant health problem, with a total of at least 1.1 million people infected and some 600,000 dead. At least 480,000 Thais still live with AIDS, susceptible to opportunistic diseases and requiring expensive antiretroviral medicines.

Bird Flu, SARS and MERS

The Thai government responded more effectively to the Avian Influenza. Again, however, there was an initial delay in taking necessary action for fear of impacting profitable duck and chicken businesses.

When SARS broke out in 2002, Thailand’s Center for Disease Control immediately limited travel to and from affected areas. The result: only nine infections and two deaths in Thailand, compared to more than 600 deaths in China and Hong Kong.

Unlike the current Covid-19 pandemic, however, those disease threats – SARS, MERS, and Avian Flu – were relatively slow-moving. Even HIV/AIDS took years to spread.

Confused Communication

In contrast, Covid-19 has spread around the world in only a few months and threatens to overwhelm medical facilities in several countries. If fast, effective action is not taken, Thailand could suffer the same fate, even though its universal health program and excellent hospitals compare favorably to even the advanced countries of Europe.

Unfortunately, the government has not made a good start. Communications have been contradictory and confused. Some policies have been unworkable. There has been a tendency to blame foreigners long after local transmission of the virus among Thais became the main cause of infection. So far, there appears to be no single government leader people trust to give them needed information or make sound, well-coordinated policy decisions.

At the onset of the pandemic, the public health minister, Anutin Charnvirakul, insisted on stopping flights out of China, but that was challenged by the sports and tourism minister apparently fearful of a dip in tourist numbers. Ultimately the cabinet decided to veto the ban as “excessive”.

Public Health Minister Anutin Charnvirakul pulled down his face mask to speak to journalists and allowed officials to crowd around him — hardly a great example of safe conduct.

Soon afterwards, however, the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand ordered travel restrictions first for China and three other countries. That was quickly extended to 11 countries – all without reference to the Ministry of Public Health. The restrictions required a certificate showing the traveler is virus free. This caused widespread confusion and dismay among Thais trying to return home because was no way to get such certificates in most countries. The Transport Minister denied the restrictions were in place, but then the government denied the denial. Within hours, Gen. Prime Minister Prayut added to the confusion, announcing the regulations would be extended to cover all foreigners from every country seeking to enter Thailand. He gave no further details on how travelers could get the required certificates.

Earlier this month, the government said it would close its quarantine centers and require Thais to self-isolate at home. One day later, Interior Minister Gen. Anupong Paojinda contradicted the statement, insisting the centers would stay open.

Public Health Minister Anutin, despite competent support staff, had his own communication problems. He lashed out at doctors who contracted Covid-19, saying they should be “whipped” for failing to take appropriate safety measures. The comments aroused complaints from medical personnel and the public, forcing the minister to apologize for his words, saying he did not realize the doctors had been exposed while trying to treat patients.

Despite an effective health system, the government has created confusion over the availability of personal protective equipment, such as face masks. The Commerce Ministry announced there would be no shortages because the country can manufacture 100 million masks per month. Soon afterwards, however, the Internal Trade Department corrected the announcement, saying capacity was actually 36 million masks. Will it be enough? Government assurances of a sufficient supply did not stop panic buying and shortages in the pharmacies.

As a Bangkok Post editorial put it: “The Prayut Chan-o-cha government appears to lack skills regarding crisis communication, a crucial factor which can cause a situation to deteriorate further if not managed properly.”

The Threat of 1918 in 2020

The current government has no one like Anand, widely trusted to make wise policy decisions, and it has no Mechai to communicate decisions effectively. Too many people are not following the recommended social distancing and hygiene practices. The threat is that Covid-19 will be as serious as the 1918 pandemic.

Extrapolating from the 1918 percentages for a Thai population now nearly 70 million, that would mean 25 million people infected and 700,000 deaths. The government must urgently improve its performance, especially at the top levels, and people must put aside their justified distrust of the generals and politicians to take the needed precautions. The alternative, history shows, could be grim.

New historical novels allow readers to experience little-known periods of Thai history

Yuangrat and I have always enjoyed historical novels that allow readers to live vicariously through interesting periods of history. Such novels, when well-done, provide a feel for history that goes beyond what all but the best academic history books can do. Two recently published novels achieve this for the Thai experience of the two World Wars.

Last to the Front

The novel Last to the Front by Gee Svasti follows a company of Thai transport troops sent to Europe to serve in World War I. The delivery of ammunition to the front puts the Thai truck drivers in range of big German guns. Although some suffered wounds from the shelling, the only deaths were from accidents and disease. The Thai soldiers suffer from the confusion, bureaucratic incompetence and shortages of wartime Europe.

Like troops from Africa, India and Indo-China, the Thais face European ignorance and racism, but manage to do their jobs effectively and sometimes bravely. The Thais do not imagine their efforts and sacrifices will make much difference in the outcome of the war, but serve from a sense of duty and adventure. The Siamese government’s objectives were to gain a voice in the post-war revision of treaties and re-distribution of territory.

Svasti takes the Thai troops from their rural homes, through their training and the difficult sea journey to Europe. He paints a detailed picture of the Thai experience in evocative language showing personal knowledge of the areas of France and Germany where the Thai troops were active.

The author uses his imagination to fill in the blanks left by traditional history, but, as far as we can tell, never violates the facts of that history. The Thai soldiers come alive as individuals: the competent and honorable Chai, the self-doubting and temperamental Sumet, the rough but brave Born, and the overwhelmed embassy official Pramot. Unlike many historical novels about Thailand, all but one of the main characters are Thai and none of them are stereotypes.

A tentative romance between Chai and a French school teacher appears doomed by racism and the chaos of war. It is only in the epilogue we learn the fate of the lovers.

Gee Svasti is a Thai-British writer and media entrepreneur who splits his time between Thailand and Europe. Previous books include the novel A Dangerous Recipe and the magical children's book, Rabbit Cloud and the Rain Makers.

Thai troops march in Paris in a parade celebrating victory in World War I.

Times of Love and War

Claire Keefe-Fox, a French-American writer with a degree in Thai studies, has written a wide-ranging novel of World War II, sweeping the reader from Siam to China, Burma and India. The main protagonists are an Irish-American nurse and a British journalist and intelligence agent, but she also creates Thai characters – a courageous doctor and an upper class lady that ring true.

The story begins in pre-war Bangkok with the unlikely romance between Lawrence Gallet, the privileged Englishman, and Kate Fallon, the lower-class American who has fled a broken romance to serve with French nuns at St. Louis Hospital.

Gallet, with little direction in life, is in Bangkok living with aristocratic Thai friends and trying to write a book about the 1932 overthrow of the traditional Thai monarchy. This allows Keefe-Fox, a former director of the Alliance Francais in Bangkok, to imagine the interactions among the leading Thai politicians – Prime Minister Pibulsonggram and his rival, Pridi Banomyong. The device is unusual, but we enjoyed it because we devoted three chapters of our history Radical Thought, Thai Mind to Pridi and Pibulsonggram.

In anticipation of the war coming to Southeast Asia, Gallet is recruited and trained as an agent for Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE). The purpose of SOE was to conduct espionage, sabotage and reconnaissance in occupied Southeast Asia, and to aid local resistance movements.

When Japanese forces invade Thailand, Gallet escapes to China and then Burma, while Kate disguises her American nationality and continues to work at the hospital. Keefe-Fox paints a believably gritty picture of the hardships of life in Bangkok under Japanese wartime domination. There are shortages of food and medicine and fears of the Kempeitai, the ruthless military police of the Japanese Army.

A Japanese doctor discovers Kate’s nationality and threatens to expose her as an enemy national. He forces her to serve him as his nurse and sex slave, but the conflicted doctor also helps her send food packets to prisoners and steals medicines for her to use at the hospital. When one of her friends, an Irish nurse, dies, Kate assumes her identity and the death is registered as Kate’s.

Dr. Sumet, one of the hospital doctors, is drawn into the Seri Thai resistance that operates under the secret leadership of Pridi. At the same time, Gallet is working as a journalist and interacting with newsmen covering the war in Southeast Asia. He barely survives the disastrous British retreat from Burma, walking through the jungle to India.

Once he has recovered, he is charged with training the Free Thai agents who are to be infiltrated back into Thailand to sabotage the Japanese. He is devastated when word comes that Kate has died. It is only when he returns to their former house, he finds word she may still be alive.

Keefe-Fox does an excellent job of weaving her tale between her fictional characters and historical personages, such as Vinegar Joe Stillwell, Pridi, and a variety of well-known American and British journalists. She manages to give us a feel for the confusion and horror of the war as well as the difficult moral choices people are forced to make under the stress of conflict.

Defeated Japanese soldiers being sent to prisoner of war camps outside Bangkok in 1945

Keefe-Fox is the author of the novel Siamese Tears, which brings to life the French aggression against Siam in the late 1800s through the eyes of a British-French woman in Bangkok. She has also written three novels about Thailand in French.

Both Svasti and Keefe-Fox give us well-researched stories that bring Thai history alive, accomplishments we will try to emulate in our upcoming novel Beads on a String.

Note: The two new novels can be purchased now at https://www.riverbooksbk.com/, and both should be available on Amazon.com April 15.

Wave of student protests recalls the history of failed government response

Student protests erupted at dozens of Thai colleges and high schools this week in the wake of the dissolution of a popular opposition party. The demonstrations have escalated into wider criticism of the authoritarian government. The protests recall past demonstrations that military and government leaders have mishandled, leading to deaths and government overthrows.

Student protest at Thammasat University, the site of protests that led to government downfalls

Opposition party banned

Future Forward Party election poster

The fuse was lit by the court-ordered dissolution of the Future Forward Party, the country’s second largest opposition party. Future Forward articulated policies that garnered more than 6 million votes, many from young voters, in last year’s election. The court ruled the party deserved punishment because it accepted a loan from its wealthy founder, 41-year-old Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit. No action, however, was taken against other political parties believed to have taken loans.

The pattern of dissolving opposition parties

Over the past 15 years Thai courts have dissolved four political parties – all of them opposed to the authoritarian military establishment behind the current Thai government. The justifications vary, but no pro-military party has ever been banned. On the eve of elections last year, the opposition Thai Raksa Chart Party was banned for nominating a member of the Thai royal family as its candidate for prime minister. None of the justifications for party dissolution come anywhere near the European Community standard that parties should be banned only if they advocate or undertake violence.

The latest student protests have extended to all parts of the country and included schools considered elite and conservative. Apparently aware of past government mishandling of student protests, the police have not yet arrested any protesters, but they warned that violators of assembly laws may be prosecuted later.

Past protests

In October 1973, the arrest of activists calling on the military dictatorship to fulfill long-delayed promises of a democratic constitution, turned small protests into a nation-wide wave of anger against the government. Violent military attempts to suppress the demonstrations escalated the protests, leading to the downfall of the ruling generals who fled the country.

Three years later, the failure of security forces to control right-wing violence against student demonstrators led to a military coup. In 1992, the military used force to break up demonstrations against an army leader becoming prime minister. The military’s harsh action, causing at least 52 deaths and hundreds of injuries, ended in the collapse of the government and new elections.

Troops attack protesters in May, 1992, leading to the collapse of the government

Tough military action against protesters in 2010 led to at least 80 civilian deaths and later to a devastating election loss by the ruling pro-military political party. Conservative, pro-military protests undermined the elected government in 2014 and led to a coup d’etat.

So, history shows the military would be wise to treat the student demonstrations with great care.

The prime minister’s advantages

A key consideration will be preventing the demonstrations from opening cracks in the coalition of conservatives, royalists, military leaders and business people supporting Prime Minister Gen. Prayut Chan-O-Cha. The general, who led the military coup that overthrew an elected government in 2014, has benefited from the party bans and the 2017 constitution that allows the military to hand-pick 200 of the 250 members of the supposedly non-partisan senate. Prayut’s five years of unlimited power following the coup also gave him influence over the selection of the judges who have repeatedly ruled against his political opponents. Those judgments, often contrary to international practice and Thai precedent, are creating the impression that the law in Thailand is becoming a tool of political control.

All these advantages mean Prayut’s government controls the legislative, administrative and legal branches of the government. He demonstrated his control this week as he easily survived a vote of no confidence in the Parliament.

Opponents therefore may see little hope for parliamentary or legal means to challenge the government. The outbreak of protests is the unsurprising result.

Preserving the interests of government backers

The government’s handling of the on-going protests will be critical for its short-term survival. History shows that protests alone may not overthrow a government, but if the government fails to protect the interests of military officers or maintain the support of business and the middle class, it becomes vulnerable.

The 1973 protests succeeded because the dictators failed to deal with dissatisfaction within the army at their long refusal to retire from active military posts. The dictatorship collapsed when the army commander refused to obey government orders to send more troops to the capital to crush dissent.

The 1992 protests led to new elections because the military lost the support of business people and the conservative middle class. The Future Forward Party is now dissolved, but Thanathorn and fellow party founders have pledged to push for change under a new organization, the Future Forward Committee. The committee has the funds, the social media savvy and the popular dissatisfaction needed to organize protests against the government and the military.

The government has responded with a variety of charges that could lead to prison sentences for Committee members, but it must be wary of convictions that only energize larger protests. In any case, Future Forward’s attacks on military privilege have already led to responses that could open cracks in army backing.

Prime Minister Prayut speaks in Parliament

Responding to attacks from Future Forward, Prime Minister Prayut promised to cut the unusually high number of generals in half over the next eight years. Whether or not he keeps that promise, it may already be creating questions in the minds of ranking officers.

A mass shooting by a disgruntled soldier that killed 29 people this month led to promises to improve treatment of low-ranking soldiers and cut down on shady business activities by serving military officers. If carried out, such reforms would mean some officers would lose significant income.

Questions raised over retired generals continuing to live for free in sometimes luxurious military housing have put pressure on the army commander to kick retired officers out of their tax-payer-funded homes. According to army regulations such housing is reserved for serving officers. One of the army retirees living in army housing is Prayut himself, but he, like other generals have claimed exemption from the regulations because they are “serving society.”

The dilemma for the government is that moves to respond to justified public concerns about military privilege may undercut Prayut’s military support. Refusing to respond, or failing to fulfill promises of reform, however, could turn not just youth, but more of the middle class against the regime, especially if the economy worsens.

Economic and public health threats

The Thai economy has been in decline since the latest Prayut government took power, leading to questions about government economic management ability. The threat of the Covid-19 virus and dangerous air pollution have added to the economic problems and created nationwide health worries.

The government and the military have great powers and they may be able to wield those powers cleverly to allow the students to harmlessly blow off steam. Hopefully, the government will improve its performance against the economic and public health threats.

But even such success does not guarantee future dominance. The protests this week show that the government has alienated Thailand’s educated youth who aspire to a more open society.

It may rule the present, but it may already have lost the future.