Thirty years ago today, I was watching television at home when an image of the Thai flag and the sound of martial music replaced the morning news program. It marked Thailand’s 17th attempted coup and set off a string of events that offer lessons today to both military coup-makers and anti-military protesters in Thailand and Myanmar.
The February 23rd coup, like the 2014 coup in Thailand and the 2021 coup in Myanmar, went smoothly, with the arrest of civilian leaders and the quick seizure of all government functions. Just over two years later, however, the Thai coup-leader’s attempt to make his power permanent ended in violence and an ignominious resignation.
What went wrong for the military?
The 1991 coup, which I covered as bureau chief for United Press International, faced little public opposition, in part because the military justified its takeover by citing the alleged corruption of the elected government of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan. Although the military’s own reputation for honesty was little better than the ousted government, coup-leader Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon bought himself some breathing room by promising never to seek political power and by appointing Anand Panyarachun, a respected diplomat, as interim prime minister. Anand ran the country mostly independently of the generals and held new elections. Anand’s performance in office mollified many of those opposed to the coup, but when the military used its money and influence in the 1992 elections to hand Suchinda the prime ministership, the floodgates broke.
Mass protests against Suchinda and his broken promise gathered widespread support even among conservative middle-class urbanites who turned out for what became known as the “mobile phone mob.” The military’s attempt to end the protests with violence led to 52 officially confirmed deaths, many disappearances, hundreds of injuries, and over 3,500 arrests. This over-reaction by the military turned more people against Suchinda and led to King Bhumibol Adulyadej stepping in to demand that both military and opposition leaders stop their activities. Suchinda resigned and Anand was again appointed to lead an interim government holding new elections.
Thai demonstrators gather at the Democracy Monument in 1992 calling for the coup-leader’s resignation
Lessons learned for the military
Swift seizure of power doesn’t necessarily mean long-term victory. Broken promises and manipulation of elections to put military men in top government positions can lead to continuing unrest and loss of power. We are seeing that now with the continuing protests against Gen. Prayut Chan-O-Cha, the leader of the most recent Thai coup in 2014. Prayut’s government has used arrests and harsh measures against the protesters, but it so far has stopped short of the 1992 level of violence.
In Myanmar, the public reaction to the coup has been faster and fiercer. Widespread public protests and general strikes put the military on the defensive within days of the takeover. The generals seem to realize that violent suppression, like that in 1988 and 2007, could be counter-productive, but there is little in the military’s training or inclinations to stop them from murdering large numbers of protesters if the military feels sufficiently threatened. Like Suchinda, the Myanmar coup-leader, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, has promised an end to military rule in a year, but it appears likely that the general will seek to prolong his hold on power, possibly as an elected president. The Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, should realize that rigging an election outcome in favor of the military-backed political party (overwhelmingly defeated in November 2020) will only lead to more protests.
In 2021 demonstrators in Myanmar demanded the release of NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the return to power of the government elected overwhelmingly in 2020. Like their Thai counterparts, they adopted the three-finger protest salute from the movie Hunger Games.
Lessons for the protesters
The 1992 protests had a clear, common objective: Suchinda’s resignation. The demonstrations were coordinated by committee representing the various groups involved in the protests. The latest protests against the Prayut government, however, have so far failed to settle on a single clear objective and they appear to have little coordination. They have attracted idealistic youth, but not the urban middle class or rural farmers. The appeal has to be broader and more tightly focused on military power.
When the 1992 protests triggered the resignation of Gen. Suchinda, new elections were held and a new, more democratic constitution was promulgated. The Thai military appeared to have stepped back from political power.
The 2005 re-election of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, however, threatened military and conservative power and privilege. Thaksin, a telecommunications billionaire and former police officer, achieved dominance not only in Parliament, but in the police, the judiciary and the independent organizations that were created to ensure good governance. Thaksin, who had graduated from Thailand’s military academy, sought to extend his personal influence over top military promotions instead of working to reform military training and culture to accept civilian control. The military reasserted its dominance with coups ousting Thaksin in 2006 and his sister Yingluck in 2014. The key lessons may be that constitutions and laws will ultimately have little ability to control a military with a monopoly on the use of deadly force if that military sees itself as deserving extensive political power.
Thai protesters in 2020 had three demands to the government and a list of 10 reforms to the monarchy
For Myanmar, the situation for protesters is even more difficult. Although the civilian government under National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi accepted a constitution that entrenched military power, the Tatmadaw could not tolerate even modest attempts to reduce that power. The lesson may be that any efforts to reduce military domination cannot focus only on the roles of the top generals. Somehow reform of military training, recruitment and operations must influence and gradually change the mindset of those in uniform down to the lowest level. Currently, those serving in the military receive no training on human rights, law or their duty to serve the elected government. Most Tatmadaw personnel live in camps that separate them from civilian life with their own housing, schools, business benefits and social interactions. Most officers serve, at least initially, in border units fighting ethnic insurgents where they are taught that the people are their enemies, enemies without rights. It is hard to imagine that top Tatmadaw leaders will change if their subordinates continue to believe their first loyalty is to their commanders not to the Myanmar people.
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