The recurring nightmare of history
As strange as it may seem, the uncertain situation created by Thailand’s March 24 election (described in our April 18 blog) is not unprecedented. As we discussed in our blogs of March 16 and March 21, there have been several elections conducted by military coup groups. Military leaders sought democratic legitimacy for their seizures of power in the elections of 1957, 1969 and 1992. All three elections led to disorder and or violence. Two led to further coups.
The 1957 dirty polls
The most troubling was the 1957 election, known as “the dirtiest election in Thai history.” Alleged vote-rigging led to the victory of the pro-military party, headed by Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsonggram. Newspapers reported many of the poll abuses and denounced the results. Public protests forced the government to declare a national emergency. The chaos deepened divisions between the army and the police. The army commander, Gen. Sarit Thanarat, withdrew the support of the army faction in parliament and then led a coup in September that ousted the Phibun government.
The coup group held new elections in December 1957 seeking legitimacy behind the pro-junta Sahaphum party. As in 2019, the junta rewrote elections rules and poached veteran politicians from other parties yet still failed to win a majority in parliament. Sahaphum won only 40 of the 160 seats, but formed shaky alliances with smaller parties and independents to form a government. Prime Minister Field Marshal Thanom Kittakachorn, however, proved unable to manage his fractious coalition. The public and the press turned against his government. Less than a year later, another military coup swept away the elected government, ushering in a decade of dictatorship.
Elections in 1969 led to a coup and disgrace
A decade after his second coup, Thanom took another stab at elections in 1969 with a military-backed party named the United Thai People’s Party. Despite government and military support, the party won only 75 of the 219 seats, forcing it into another unstable coalition. Once again the military’s civilian partners proved hard to manage. In 1971 Thanom dissolved his own government in a military takeover that soon lost public support. It fell in October 1973 to massive public demonstrations and dissatisfaction in the army.
Elections in 1992 and Black May violence
The coup group that seized power in 1991 sought democratic credentials with elections the following year. Military-backed parties won enough seats to form a government, but struggled to find someone to head it. Their first candidate was disqualified due to accusations of drug trafficking. They then turned to the coup leader, Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon, who had sworn never to become prime minister. Suchinda went back on his promise. That launched mass protests. The military tried using force to break up the protests. The ensuing violence, known as Black May led to at least 52 confirmed deaths, many disappearances, hundreds of injuries, and over 3,500 arrests. Intervention by King Bhumibol Adulyadej led to Suchinda’s resignation, the end of the protests and the installation of a government charged with holding new elections.
History lessons learned?
Prime Minister Prayut clearly learned from Suchinda’s fate. He was careful to label himself a politician before the polls and to be named as a candidate for the premiership even though he was not running for a seat in Parliament. During his five years in power, he was judicious in its use of violence and diligent in preventing large-scale protests, avoiding the chaos and violence of 1957 and 1992. The military has also learned from its failure in the 2007 polls when the party of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin returned to power. The establishment of the appointed Senate with its role in voting for the prime minister appears to preclude the possibility of a government led by the pro-Thaksin PTP.
The question is whether Prayut and the military will have the political skills to manage a parliament in which they will struggle to find support. That was the military’s undoing in 1957, 1958, 1961 and 1971. Prayut, however, could find encouragement in the history of Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda, the former army commander who served as prime minister for eight years in the 1980s. The differences are that Prem had no party of his own and willingly shared power with the civilian parties while maintaining military influence. Prem was buoyed by a booming economy and the collapse of a communist insurgency. He was well served by his calm personality and close relationship with a popular and long-serving monarch. All that earned him support from the general public. Even Prem, however, struggled with factional in-fighting in the army and he had to fight off two attempted coups.
Challenges for Prayut
If Prayut succeeds in staying in power once the election results are official, his problems will only just begin. The challenges are:
· Overcoming public perceptions he benefited from flawed elections and the undemocratic Senate.
· Transforming himself from military commander and dictator to political deal-maker.
· Finding solutions for a slowing economy and increasing economic inequality.
· Meeting the demands of the small parties he will need to pass legislation and survive votes of no confidence.
· Maintaining army unity and satisfaction amid the compromises he undoubtedly will have to make.
· Countering the opposition of the PTP and its supporters in the rural north and northeast who have already demonstrated their willingness to join mass demonstrations.
· Dealing with the policy and public relations challenges posed by the Future Forward Party, which has nationwide backing drawn from the young and well-educated fed up with military rule.
Thailand’s difficult political history shows that most coup leaders have failed to meet challenges that were less complex. Prayut will have to decide whether to be guided by the example of Prem or of dictators Sarit and Thanom.
Challenges for the Thai people
The road to effective democratic rule, however, does not depend only on Prayut or even the civilian political party leaders, but on the Thai people. The history of Thais rejecting the law, welcoming dictatorship, demonizing opponents and resorting to violence does not bode well.
The past decade of political conflict shows there is much to learn: demonstrating opposition without violence, showing the patience for long-term solutions and refusing to accept authoritarian rule. Already the legal and personal attacks on the FFP leader show that such changes will not come quickly or easily, but improved education, greater access to information and recognition of the disastrous past suggest hope for the future.