Coups and restoring “democracy”, patterns in the past
As Thailand heads towards its first elections since the 2014 coup, the history of post-coup elections may be relevant. Military coup groups, like the current regime, have often sought to continue in power through the mechanisms of electoral democracy. The record is mixed, but here are some points to consider.
Military – Politician Split
An alliance of civilian and military leaders educated in Europe led the 1932 coup that overthrew the traditional monarchy. They proclaimed a democracy. Almost immediately, however, conflicts erupted over a radical economic plan, the role of the monarchy and the coup group’s personal ambitions. Those struggles led to another coup in June 1933.
The first nation-wide elections took place in November 1933, but political parties were forbidden, so all candidates ran as independents. In retrospect, the lack of parties meant that there was little effort to build mass political support and scant cooperation among the elected members of Parliament. That civilian political weakness allowed the military under Field Marshal P. Phibunsonggram and others to gain power and pervert the original democratic ideals of the coup group while maintaining the outward form of democracy. This authoritarian content in democratic form has continued into the 21st century. Can the upcoming elections lead back to military-civilian cooperation?
Easier to stage coups than win elections
The army overthrew the elected government in 1947 and then held new elections. The army-backed parties, however, fared poorly in the polls. The Democrat party won the majority of seats in the new assembly. Dissatisfied with the election outcome, the Soldiers Committee forced the prime minister to resign and made Field Marshal Phibun prime minister once again.
In 1957 Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat seized power. He sought to consolidate his power with elections in December that year, but his party won only 44 seats in the 160-seat Parliament. He had to resort to coercion and bribery to install a government.
In 1969, the military held elections after more than a decade, but the military-backed United Thai People Party won only 75 of the 219 seats in Parliament. It had to lure 30 independents to form a government that led to a shaky coalition. That government soon ended in another coup.
A half-century later, the military faced similar problems winning elections after overthrowing the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Despite more than a year of military-led government, a re-written constitution, new election laws, dissolving Thaksin’s party and banning most of its executives, Thaksin’s supporters again won elections in 2007 and 2011. Some therefore saw the 2006 overthrow as a “wasted coup.”
The challenge now for the pro-military parties is to avoid wasting another coup and five years of military rule.
Winning elections is not enough
Field Marshal P. Phibulsonggram
In 1951, Prime Minister Phibulsonggram and his army backers became frustrated with criticism from Parliament and launched a coup to remove opposition lawmakers. In the next elections, held in early 1957, the political parties backed by the coup group won a majority of the seats in Parliament. Widespread coercion and vote-rigging, however, sparked mass protests. Unable to quiet the protests, the military-led government declared a state of emergency and later launched another coup.
In 1971, army leaders became irritated at the difficulties of managing an elected Parliament. Only two years after winning elections, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn carried out a “self-coup” against his own government and ruled through a nine-member National Executive Council. The clumsy, corrupt and authoritarian rule of Thanom and his allies not only heightened a public desire for democracy but undermined support for the dictatorship among senior army officers. When the army commander, Gen. Kris Sivara, refused to send more troops to suppress massive, student-led protests in 1973 and King Bhumibol Adulyadej called for an end to the killing, Thanom and Prapat fled the country.
Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat
With its appointment of most of the upper house of Parliament, the coup-makers have a good chance to return to power at the end of this month, but it may not be easy to stay in power if the elected MPs or the general public are angry at the outcome.
Full dictatorship
The longest period of military rule came from 1958 to 1973 when the army gave up trying to be democratic. Fed up with difficulties in dealing with the elected Parliament, Sarit staged a coup in October 1958 to overthrow the government he had set up himself. This coup heralded a harsh authoritarian era in Thai politics. Sarit scrapped the constitution and dissolved all political parties except for his own. He arrested editors, reporters and political activists. He imposed censorship on all media. Summary execution, police torture and corruption became hallmarks of his regime.
After his death in 1963, Sarit’s policies and army domination continued under Thanom and his powerful interior minister, Gen. Prapat Charusathien. They repeatedly delayed new elections, blaming insecurity due to the communist insurgency.
The current elections are a chance to move back to more than just the form of democratic rule and to ease the harshest measures of the current government. It would be unfortunate to miss this opportunity.
The path from general to prime minister
For much of Thailand’s modern history, the country has been ruled by military men, but they have come to power in different ways. Some, like Gen. Prem Tinasulanonda were appointed by Parliament, some, like Sarit and Thanom, seized power in a coup, and some won election as civilian-style politicians, like Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and Gen. Chatichai Choonhavan. Others, like current Prime Minister Prayut Chan-O-Cha, have tried to move from coup maker to government leader via elections. The most interesting example is Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon. After overthrowing an elected government, Suchinda promised he would never take office as the prime minister. When military-backed parties selected him even though he was not elected to Parliament, however, he accepted. Public protests broke out and mounted swiftly. Violent suppression of the protests led to royal intervention, Suchinda’s resignation and new elections.
Prime Minister Prayut seems intent on making this transition, but it may not be easy.
Military – politician balancing act
In some periods, military leaders and civilian politicians have found accommodation. The eight years of Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda as the prime minister saw a balancing act between military and civilian interests. Similarly, the 1992 elections ushered in 14 years of civilian rule. The military, seeking to be seen as more professional, retained influence, but stayed in the background.
The new elections are an opportunity to at least partially re-balance military-civilian power, but the outcome is unlikely to please either.
Efforts to appoint an unelected coup leader, Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon, as prime minister after elections in 1992 led to deadly clashes between troops and protesters. King Bhumibol Adulyadej stepped in, Gen. Suchinda resigned and new elections were held. The military then avoided coups for 14 years.
Military political power has increased
Whether in times of direct military control or behind-the-scenes influence, the military’s political power has generally increased over time. It has gained ownership of radio and TV stations, a large budget, influence over the votes of soldiers, a role in some state enterprises and the ability to threaten further coups. The military has improved its public image since 1957 by proclaiming itself as the ultimate and necessary protector of the monarchy. It has successfully settled the 1950s conflicts between the army and the navy and between the army and the police that triggered several coups. The army is now supreme. Similarly the factional squabbles in the army that sparked abortive coups in the 1970s and 80s appear to have eased.
Military political power now faces a critical test — not just whether it can elect Prayut, but whether it can manage an elected government and a Parliament that will include parties still angry at nearly more than a decade of harsh treatment.
Return to “democracy”
Despite its history of dictatorial rule from the 1950s to the 1970s and its difficulties winning elections or managing elected governments, the military seems to feel a continuing need to return to democracy. Coup groups held elections in 1933, 1947, 1951, 1958, 1969, 1972, 1979, 1992, 2007 and now again in 2019. Even authoritarians such as Phibul, Sarit and Thanom felt the need to hold elections. The issue for the military coup makers is how to have the “cake” of public and international acceptance from elections and still get to eat the cake of political power and privilege.
That is the problem facing the coup leaders behind Prime Minister Prayut Chan-O-Cha in the polls scheduled to take place on March 24. What lessons has the current coup group learned from this history?
That will be my theme for the next blog. It will look at the legal, political and structural changes put in place by the coup makers in the five years of preparations for this month’s elections.
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For more detail on Thailand’s long history of coups and post-coup elections, the following books can be helpful:
Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, Thak Chaloemtiarana
Thai Politics: Extracts and Documents 1932-1957, Thak Chaloemtiarana, ed.
The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86, Suchit Bunbongkarn
The Political Development of Modern Thailand, Federico Ferrara
A History of Thailand, Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit
Chronicle of Thailand, Headline News Since 1946, Nicholas Grossman, ed.
Radical Thought, Thai Mind, Yuangrat Wedel and Paul Wedel
The Balancing Act, A History of Modern Thailand, Joseph J. Wright Jr.
Political conflict in Thailand: reform, reaction, revolution, David Morell, Chaiʻanan Samutwanit
"Good Coup" Gone Bad: Thailand's Political Development since Thaksin's Downfall, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ed.
Khaki Capital: The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia, Paul Chambers and Napisa Waitoolkiat, eds.